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PATENTLY INCONSISTENT: 
STATE AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY IN INTER PARTES REVIEW* 
JOHN MIXON† 
INTRODUCTION 
From 2016 to 2017, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
(“PTAB” or the “Board”), an adjudicatory branch of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),1 instituted five 
separate inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings against patents 
owned by various state universities.2  Upon instituting these 
proceedings, the universities all moved to dismiss the 
 
* Currently, there is no consensus regarding the appropriate nomenclature that 
should be used to refer to the indigenous groups known as American Indians or 
Native Americans due to various factors such as culture, geographic region, and 
individual preference. Throughout this Note, the terms “Native American” and 
“Indian” are used interchangeably due to such lack of consensus and the fact that 
the cases addressing Native American sovereignty use the terms “Indians” and 
“Native Americans” interchangeably. 
† Senior Staff Member, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2020, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S. 2016, SUNY Cortland. Thank you to Professor 
Subotnik for her invaluable guidance and insight throughout the Note-writing 
process and to my family for their support throughout my time in law school. 
1 The USPTO is the federal agency responsible for “granting U.S. patents and 
registering trademarks.” About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last updated Mar. 12, 2019). Within the USPTO, 
the PTAB is responsible for issuing decisions on patent appeals and post-grant 
challenges. About PTAB, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab (last updated 
Mar. 14, 2019). 
2 See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL 
6517562 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 
IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd., 
LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 
2017); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 
12969 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., 
No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
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proceedings on state sovereign immunity grounds.3  While only 
three of these proceedings resulted in the dismissal of the state 
entities,4 the cumulative effect of the five proceedings was that 
state-owned patents are clearly insulated from IPR proceedings 
by state sovereign immunity so long as the state does not 
(1) bring a federal patent infringement suit or (2) transfer all 
substantive rights in the patent in question to a separate third 
party.5 
Perhaps inspired by these developments, the pharmaceutical 
company Allergan adopted a noteworthy approach to the IPRs 
that were instituted against six of its patents on December 8, 
2016.6  Attempting to avoid the proceedings, Allergan assigned 
all of its rights in the six patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe.7  The tribe then moved 
to dismiss the proceedings based on tribal sovereign immunity.8  
However, in Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe (Mylan I), the PTAB found that unlike states, tribes could 
not use their sovereign immunity to avoid IPRs.9  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
PTAB’s holding in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Mylan II).10  As a result of these decisions, 
there was a brief inconsistency between how tribal sovereign 
immunity was treated and how state sovereign immunity was 
treated in IPR proceedings11 until the recent decision in Regents 
of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp.12  In that case, the 
Federal Circuit corrected course by holding that state sovereign 
 
3 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1; Reactive 
Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *3–4; 
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. 
4 See Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. 
LEXIS 12969, at *31; Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. 
5 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3–4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3–4; 
Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *6–7; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 
12969, at *30–31; Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *17. 
6 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Mylan I), No. IPR2016-
01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam). 
7 Id. at *2. 
8 Id. at *1. 
9 Id. at *15. 
10 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
11 Compare Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1326, and Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15, 
with Reactive Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *1, and NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. 
LEXIS 12969, at *31, and Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. 
12 Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
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immunity may not be applied in IPRs.13  Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court can still potentially grant certiorari and reverse 
the Federal Circuit’s decision, which would result in the 
inconsistency between state and tribal sovereign immunity in 
IPRs being revived.14 
This Note is composed of four parts.  Part I reviews the 
origins, development, and purpose of both tribal and state 
sovereign immunity, compares the two doctrines, and concludes 
that the two are functionally the same despite deriving from 
different historical roots.  Part II provides an overview of the 
history and purpose behind the patent system, the America 
Invents Act, and IPRs.  Part II also analyzes the constitutionality 
of IPRs, as decided by the Supreme Court in Oil States Energy 
Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.15  Part III 
introduces and addresses the five IPR decisions on state 
sovereign immunity, Mylan I, and Mylan II.  In addition, it 
discusses the PTAB’s internal inconsistency in applying state 
and tribal sovereign immunity and the inconsistency between the 
PTAB’s state sovereign immunity precedent and the Federal 
Circuit’s rationale and holding in Mylan II.  Finally, Part IV of 
this Note argues that (1) the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II holding is 
correct; (2) policy implications dictate that sovereign immunity of 
either form should not apply in IPRs; and (3) if the Supreme 
Court grants ceriorari in LSI Corp., Mylan II’s holding, as well as 
the LSI Corp. holding should be read to prohibit both state and 




14 See Appellant University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay Issuance of the 
Mandate Pending Filing and Disposition of a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme 
Court at 3, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2019) (No. 18-1559) [hereinafter University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay]. See also 
Matthew J. Rizzolo & Kyle Tsui, Federal Circuit Confirms That State Sovereign 
Immunity, Like Tribal Immunity, Cannot Shield Patents from AIA Patent 
Challenges, Ropes & Gray: Alert (June 17, 2019), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/ 
news room/alerts/2019/06/Federal-Circuit-Confirms-that-State-Sovereign-Immunity-
Like-Tribal-Immunity-Cannot-Shield (speculating that the Supreme Court will 
grant certiorari). 
15 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
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I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
A. The Origins, Development & Purpose of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity 
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity provides that 
Native American tribes recognized by the United States may not 
be subjected to lawsuits brought by states, private individuals, or 
private entities.16  Although this doctrine as we know it today is a 
creature of federal common law,17 it is nonetheless firmly 
engrained in the legal doctrine of the United States18 and has 
historical roots that date back to before the United States 
Constitution was ratified.19 
1. The Historical Roots of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
According to Felix S. Cohen,20 the relation between the rights 
of Native Americans and Europeans in the Americas was first 
formally clarified by Francisco de Victoria in 1532.21  Victoria was 
 
16 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788–789 (2014). 
17 See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the 
Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.” (citing 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978))). 
18 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]he 
doctrine of tribal immunity is settled law . . . .”). 
19 Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (“[Native American tribes] remain ‘separate 
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.’ ” (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56)); see 
also Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (inferring that 
tribes had immunity from suit prior to the Constitutional Convention in stating that 
“it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention 
to which they were not even parties”). Upon declaring its independence, the United 
States “followed Britain’s example and recognized and interacted with indigenous 
Nations as separate sovereigns.” Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and 
Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and 
Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 
TULSA L. REV. 661, 684 (2002). Such recognition evolved into the judicially created 
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine that we know today. See id. at 682–99. 
20 Felix S. Cohen was revered by many, including Justice Frankfurter, for his 
work in shaping Native American Law. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at viii–ix (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed., The 
Michie Co. 1982) (“Cohen was the Blackstone of American Indian law.”); Felix 
Frankfurter, Foreword to Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 
355, 356 (1954) (stating that “[o]nly a ripe and imaginative scholar with a 
synthesizing faculty would have brought luminous order out of such a mish-mash” in 
reference to Cohen’s work on the 1942 version of the Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law). 
21 COHEN, supra note 20, at 50. 
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a “leading Spanish intellectual and academic” during the 1500s 
who had been tasked with advising Spain on how Spanish rights 
in the Americas interacted with Native American rights.22  Upon 
studying various property rights theories that could possibly 
allow the Spanish to take Indian land, Victoria concluded that 
Europeans had no right to Indian land unless the Indians 
voluntarily handed it over to them.23 
Victoria’s conclusion was meant to accord respect to Indian 
tribes as sovereign nations and led to Spanish treaties, laws, and 
charters recognizing Indian tribes as sovereign nations.24  
Victoria’s view of Native American sovereignty eventually 
became widely adopted by European nations, and although there 
were many instances of ethnocentric invasion and improper 
taking of Native American land,25 most of the land obtained by 
Europeans settling in colonial America was purchased from 
Native American tribes.26  In fact, according to Cohen, the 
recognition of tribes as sovereign nations was so widespread that 
it was accepted by international law scholars of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, who were then cited as 
authority in federal cases, such as Johnson v. M’Intosh, one of 
the earliest United States Supreme Court cases involving Native 
American rights.27 
2. The Marshall Trilogy & the Doctrine’s Subsequent 
Developments 
Even more telling of tribal sovereignty than federal court 
citations to colonial-era treatises is the fact that the United 
States Constitution explicitly refers to Native American tribes as 
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 50–51. 
24 Id. at 51–52. 
25 Id. at 52–53 (“Although the actions of Spanish conquistadores and 
government administrators often contrasted sharply with the principles expressed in 
these doctrines, generally such actions violated rather than reflected existing 
Spanish law. . . . These tenets were adhered to in the earliest dealings between 
European settlers and Indians.”). 
26 See id. at 52–58. 
27 Id. at 52 & nn.19–20; see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
563–65, 567–71 (1823) (citing various natural and international law writers, such as 
Emmerich de Vattel and Hugo Grotius). Hugo Grotius was a seventeenth-century 
scholar, and Emmerich de Vattel was an eighteenth-century scholar. See F. S. 
Ruddy, International Law and the Enlightenment: Vattel and the 18th Century, 3 
INT’L LAW. 839, 839, 841 (1969) (discussing Grotius’s and Vattel’s work). 
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entities separate from the states28 and grants the president the 
power to make treaties with them as if they are a sovereign 
nation.29  Indeed, to an extent, it was these constitutional 
predicates that the Supreme Court relied on in a series of three 
cases where it recognized Indian tribes as sovereign nations.30  
These three cases are known as the Marshall Trilogy.31 
The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, involved a 
dispute over land that the Piankeshaw Indians sold to the 
plaintiff’s family prior to the end of the American Revolution.32  
Following the Revolution, Virginia passed an act reclaiming all 
land that had previously been deeded by Indian tribes to private 
individuals, including the land that had been deeded to the 
plaintiff.33  Subsequently, Virginia conveyed the reclaimed land 
to the United States, which then sold the parcel that had been 
deeded to the plaintiff to the defendant.34  This caused there to be 
two “owners” of the land.35  In resolving the issue, the Supreme 
Court held that the tribe’s sale was invalid because, among other 
things, treaties that had previously been entered into between 
the tribe and the United States had ceded the land in question to 
 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes . . . .”). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519–
20 (1832) (“The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to 
be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous 
treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank among those 
powers who are capable of making treaties.”). 
30 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 519–20 (holding that a Georgia statute did 
not apply on the Cherokee Nation’s reservation because the United States had the 
sole authority to enter treaties with Indian tribes and had in fact entered into 
treaties with the tribe, which recognized it as a sovereign nation; thus, the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution prevented state law from applying in the 
tribal territory); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18–20 (1831) 
(holding that although the Commerce Clause recognizes Indian tribes as sovereign, 
they are not foreign nations, but instead sovereign nations that are dependent on 
the United States); M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593–94 (holding that a tribal sale 
of land was invalid because, among other things, the treaties between the tribe and 
the United States allowed for annulment of the sale and, since the tribe did not 
annul the agreement while it was at war with the United States, it was presumed 
that the tribe considered the deal to be void). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 963 (9th Cir. 2017); U.S. 
v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 2003); Seielstad, supra note 19, at 686. 
32 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571–72. 
33 Id. at 585–86. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 562–63. 
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the United States.36  Based on the Court’s reliance on such 
treaties, it is clear that the Court viewed the tribe as a sovereign 
nation independently capable of diplomatic relations with the 
United States. 
Eight years after M’Intosh, the Supreme Court again dealt 
with Native American sovereignty rights in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia.37  In this case the state of Georgia tried to extend its 
laws into the Cherokee Nation.38  In response, the Cherokee 
Nation claimed to be a foreign nation and filed for an injunction 
directly to the Supreme Court to give the Court original 
jurisdiction over the matter.39  Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall 
determined that the text of the Commerce Clause40 and the 
nature of the relationship between Indian tribes and the United 
States indicated that tribes were not foreign states, but rather 
“domestic dependent nations.”41  This meant that they were a 
hybrid sovereign because they were self-governing entities 
distinct from states that also relied on the United States for 
protection like “a ward to his guardian.”42 
One year after Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall 
issued the majority opinion in Worcester v. Georgia.43  In this 
case, the petitioner, a white male, was convicted for violating a 
Georgia law that required “all white persons[] residing within the 
limits of the Cherokee nation” to obtain a license and to take an 
oath of loyalty to the state of Georgia.44  The petitioner appealed 
 
36 Id. at 593–94. It is unclear from the opinion which treaty Chief Justice 
Marshall was referring to, but there were several treaties that the United States 
had entered into with various different tribes, including the Piankeshaw tribe, 
whereby the tribes relinquished their ownership rights of their land to the United 
States. See, e.g., Treaty with the Piankeshaw, Aug. 27, 1804, art. I, 7 Stat. 83; 
Treaty with the Eel River, etc., Aug. 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 77; Jon D. May, Piankashaw, 
OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php? 
entry=PI001 (last visited June 1, 2019). 
37 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
38 Id. at 15. 
39 Id. at 15–16; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2 (extending the judicial 
power to “all Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states” 
and granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in “all Cases . . . in which a 
State shall be Party”). 
40 The Commerce Clause provides, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
41 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17–20. 
42 Id. at 17. 
43 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 
(2001). 
44 Id. at 515–16. 
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his conviction, and the Supreme Court determined that states 
have no authority to enforce laws on Indian soil because treaties 
between the United States and Indians recognized Indians as 
“distinct, independent political communities.”45  The Court also 
clarified that the United States has exclusive authority to deal 
with Indian tribes.46 
While the Marshall Trilogy did not address tribal sovereign 
immunity per se, the principles set forth in these cases formed 
the foundation of the doctrine by recognizing Indian tribes as 
sovereign.47  These principles were that: (1) Native American 
tribes’ sovereignty derives from the fact that they were 
indigenous to the Americas and from their relations with 
European settlers, relations the United States subsequently 
acknowledged and adopted upon its formation;48 (2) only the 
federal government may abrogate or weaken such sovereignty;49 
and (3) tribes’ sovereignty is a hybrid between that of the states 
and foreign nations, as they are located inside the United States 
without being part of the union, but also depend on the United 
States for protection.50  In fact, these principles resurfaced nearly 
two decades after Worcester in Parks v. Ross, where the Court 
held that an officer of the Cherokee Nation could not be held 
liable for actions taken in his official tribal capacity because 
“[t]he Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and independent 
nation.”51  This was one of the first cases to suggest that tribes 
and their officers are not subject to suit due to tribal sovereignty, 
but it certainly was not the last.52 
 
45 Id. at 519. 
46 Id. at 520. 
47 See Seielstad, supra note 19, at 689 (“[T]he fact that a form of inherent 
sovereignty was recognized is significant to the development of other principles of 
tribal sovereignty such as the doctrine of tribal immunity.”). 
48 Seielstad, supra note 19, at 688. 
49 Id. While abrogation or weakening of tribal sovereignty is still exclusively the 
power of the federal government, it is worth noting that the power of states to 
enforce laws in tribal territory is no longer as impermissible as it was after the 
Marshall Trilogy. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001). Nevertheless, 
States maintain limited authority on tribal lands. Id. 
50 See Seielstad, supra note 19, at 688–89; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 
519–20; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
51 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850). 
52 It is worth noting that about two decades after Parks, Congress shifted away 
from diplomatic relations with tribes in favor of regulating tribes through 
legislation. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). This placed the power of Indian affairs 
exclusively in the control of Congress, while still recognizing the validity of all 
preexisting tribal treaties. Id. 
2019] PATENTLY INCONSISTENT 241 
In 1883, the Supreme Court resolved Ex parte 
Kan-gi-shun-ca, which involved the imprisonment and death 
sentence of a Sioux Indian for the murder of another Sioux 
Indian.53  The imprisoned Indian filed a writ of habeas corpus, 
and the Court determined that since Congress did not clearly 
intend for the statute in question to encompass Indian-on-Indian 
crimes occurring on tribal land, the lower court that convicted 
the petitioner did not have jurisdiction over him.54  Though the 
Court did not expressly declare that tribes were immune from 
suit, it communicated the principle that if tribes were to be 
subject to suit, Congress would have to pass legislation indicating 
a clear and unequivocal intent to do so.55 
Shortly thereafter, the principle requiring clear and 
unequivocal intent was reaffirmed and built upon by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Thebo v. 
Choctaw Tribe of Indians.56  In Choctaw, a United States citizen 
sued the Choctaw Tribe and some of its officers to recover 
outstanding attorney’s fees owed to the citizen.57  In resolving the 
case, the court relied on the “clear and unequivocal intent” 
standard to determine that there was no jurisdiction over the 
Choctaw Tribe.58  In fact, the court took this principle even 
further and stated that tribes “have been placed by the United 
States, substantially, on the plane occupied by the states under 
the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution,”59 which 
illustrates that the court unquestionably viewed the tribe as 
deserving of the respect typically accorded to sovereigns. 
 
53 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883). 
54 Id. at 572. 
55 Id. This principle is still present in the modern tribal sovereign immunity 
doctrine. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) 
(alterations in original) (“Our decisions establish as well that such a congressional 
decision must be clear. The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal immunity; 
and ‘[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must “unequivocally” express that 
purpose.’ ” (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 
532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001))). 
56 66 F. 372, 376 (1895) (stating that “[i]t has been the settled policy of congress 
not to sanction suits generally against the[] Indian Nations” and if it is “[t]he 
intention of congress to [subject Native Americans to suit, such intention] would 
have to be expressed in plain and unambiguous terms”). While this was only a 
circuit court case, the Supreme Court cited to this decision for support in what many 
consider to be the first case of the modern tribal immunity decisions. See infra notes 
63–65. 
57 66 F. at 373. 
58 Id. at 376. 
59 Id. 
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In tracing these tribal cases up to this point, it should be 
noted that the courts’ and Congress’s view of tribes as sovereign 
nations and on subjecting them to suit has evolved and allowed 
for some exceptions.60  However, the ultimate lessons from the 
cases that built upon the Marshall Trilogy are that: (1) despite 
courts not explicitly mentioning tribal sovereign immunity by 
name, the doctrine started to rear its head in the form of a 
jurisdictional bar that only Congress could allow circumvention 
of; and (2) despite Congress’s shift away from diplomacy with the 
tribes, the rationale for the doctrine remained rooted in the 
understanding that Native American tribes are sovereign, self-
governing nations.61  With that background, the following cases 
mark the start of what many consider the “modern era” of the 
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.62 
3. The Modern Era of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
The first of these modern tribal immunity cases is United 
States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., which was 
decided in 1940.63  In this case, the Supreme Court determined 
that although the United States could recover a bankruptcy 
judgment on behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, the 
nations were not subject to cross-claims stemming from the same 
proceeding.64  The Court’s rationale was that there is a “public 
policy which exempt[s] . . . dependent as well as . . . dominant 
sovereignties from suit without consent” and “Indian Nations are 
exempt from suit without Congressional authorization.”65 
 
60 See Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 570, 572 (1883) (recognizing an 
exception that Indian-on-Indian crimes are exempt from the jurisdiction of United 
States courts). 
61 See id. at 572; see also supra text accompanying note 60. 
62 See Brandon Andersen, Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the Patent and 
Trademark Office, 100 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 332, 336 (2018); Seielstad, 
supra note 19, at 694. 
63 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
64 Id. at 510–12. The United States was acting on behalf of the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Nations in this case because the governments of these nations were 
dissolved pursuant to statute. Id. at 512. 
65 Id. (first citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); then 
citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 
304 (8th Cir. 1908); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895)). 
The Court elaborated that because tribes possess immunity “from direct 
suit . . . [they] possess[] a similar immunity from cross-suits” because a “sovereignty 
possessing immunity should not be compelled to defend against cross-actions away 
from its own territory or in courts, not of its own choice, merely because its debtor 
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Nearly three decades later, the Supreme Court doubled down 
on its U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. holding in Puyallup Tribe, 
Inc. v. Department of Game.66  The issue in Puyallap was whether 
the Washington Department of Game could sue tribe members 
for violating state fishing regulations on the Puyallup Tribal 
reservation.67  In holding that the Puyallup Tribe was immune 
from suit, the Court reaffirmed that “[a]bsent an effective waiver 
or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise 
jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”68 
The following year, the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, which involved the relatively new Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”).69  Congress adopted the ICRA 
to apply certain individual rights from the United States 
Constitution to tribal governments.70  One such right that 
Congress included in the ICRA—which was at issue in Santa 
Clara Pueblo71—is equal protection of the law.72  In Santa Clara 
Pueblo, a woman filed suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe 
claiming it violated Title I of the ICRA because children of male 
members who married outside the tribe could be recognized as 
tribe members, but children of females married outside the tribe 
could not, which deprived her children of rights such as voting in 
tribal elections and inheriting land.73  The Supreme Court held 
that despite the tribe’s violation of the ICRA, “suits against the 
tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity” since 
there was no “unequivocal expression of contrary legislative 
intent.”74 
 
was unavailable except outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign’s consent.” Id. at 
513. 
66 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
67 Id. at 167–68. 
68 Id. at 172. 
69 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
70 Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights 
at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 467 (1998) (“The central purpose of the ICRA 
was to apply most of the provisions of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights to tribal 
governments.”). 
71 See 436 U.S. at 51. 
72 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2018) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall—deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws . . . .”). 
73 436 U.S. at 51–52. 
74 Id. at 59. In dissent, Justice White argued that Congress had a clear implicit 
intent to make tribes amenable to federal jurisdiction because the whole point of the 
ICRA was to “provide [American Indians] with the guarantee of equal protection of 
the laws” and by making tribes immune to suit the majority “denie[d] them access to 
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Shortly after Santa Clara, the Court decided Three Affiliated 
Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering in which 
it held that a state may not condition a tribe’s ability to file suit 
against a non-Indian in state court on the tribe’s waiver of its 
own tribal sovereign immunity.75  Five years later the Supreme 
Court again dealt with a state trying to subject a tribe to suit 
without its consent.76  In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Court held that 
tribal sovereign immunity bars states from collecting sales tax on 
goods sold by the Potawatomi tribe to other Indians while states 
“remain[] free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers of the 
tribe.”77  In so holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the 
principle from U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. that tribal sovereign 
immunity also prevents the tribe from being subjected to 
counterclaims in suits that it files.78 
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist underscored that 
since Native American tribes are “ ‘domestic dependent nations’ 
that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members 
and territories,” they cannot be sued without a “clear waiver by 
the tribe or congressional abrogation.”79  In support of upholding 
the doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist deferred to the fact that 
tribal immunity is a “long-established principle” of the Court that 
has been consistently approved by Congress.80  As a result, 
Potawatomi dug the roots of the doctrine further into the ground 
 
the federal courts to enforce this right.” Id. at 74 (White, J., dissenting). However, as 
the majority pointed out, “[t]ribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by 
the ICRA” and such forums are obligated to apply the ICRA as the law. Id. at 65 
(majority opinion). Nonetheless, even if there was an implicit intent by Congress to 
make tribes amenable to suit in federal court, as the majority stated, “[i]t is settled 
that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed.’ ” Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). 
75 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986) (“[T]hose statutory conditions may be met only at an 
unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty and thus operate to effectively bar the 
Tribe from the courts.”). In so holding, the Court made clear that while it may seem 
like an inequity to allow tribes to sue, but not reciprocally be sued, it is no different 
from how “the United States or [individual states may] sue in cases where they could 
not be sued as defendants because of their sovereign immunity.” Id. at 893. 
76 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 
U.S. 505, 507–08 (1991). 
77 Id. at 507. 
78 Id. at 509–10. 
79 Id. at 509 (first quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 
(1831); then citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58). 
80 Id. at 510. 
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and made clear that unless Congress says otherwise, it is here to 
stay.81 
Seven years after the Court decided Potawatomi, the Court 
echoed that sentiment when it allowed a Kiowa Tribe-owned 
commercial entity to avoid contract liability for business that was 
transacted off of the tribe’s land.82  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged that while tribal immunity may “extend[] 
beyond what is needed” in our modern society, it is nonetheless 
grounded as federal law and is solely in the hands of the tribe to 
waive or Congress to abrogate or limit.83 
Sixteen years later, the Court reaffirmed Kiowa’s holding 
when it found in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community that 
tribal sovereign immunity prevented Michigan from filing suit 
against Bay Mills Indian Community for opening a casino on 
non-tribal lands.84  The crux of Bay Mills’s holding is that courts 
“will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intend[ed] to 
undermine Indian self-government” and that Congress must 
unequivocally express its desire to abrogate tribal immunity.85  
As such, since the section of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(“IGRA”) in question only made tribes amenable to suit for 
“gaming activity located on Indian lands,” Bay Mills was immune 
from Michigan’s suit for opening its casino off the reservation.86 
A review of tribal sovereign immunity from the colonial era 
to the present makes abundantly clear that the modern doctrine 
is based on the recognition of tribes as dependent sovereign 
 
81 See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
82 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753–54, 760 (1998). 
83 Id. at 758–60; see also infra note 169 and accompanying text. In addition to 
calling the necessity of the doctrine into doubt, the Court went as far as saying that 
the doctrine “developed almost by accident.” 523 U.S. at 756. However, such a 
characterization is a misreading of the doctrine’s history because having analyzed 
tribal immunity up to this point, it is clear that Indian sovereignty has been 
recognized since before the Constitution and such sovereignty is at the heart of 
federal court decisions that have allowed Indians to avoid suit since the Founding. 
See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. None of the Court’s doubts matter of 
course as they were expressed in dicta and the Court begrudgingly acknowledged 
that tribal immunity is settled law. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756. 
84 572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014). 
85 Id. at 790 (citations omitted). 
86 Id. at 787, 803–04. In fact, the Court even acknowledged that allowing the 
tribe to be sued for on-reservation gaming, but not off-reservation gaming, appears 
to create “an apparent anomaly.” Id. at 794. However, in acknowledging this, the 
Court said that it “does not revise legislation,” that “Congress wrote the statute it 
wrote,” and that “ ‘Congress must “unequivocally” express [its] purpose’ to subject a 
tribe to litigation.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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nations that are entitled to self-government—subject to 
Congress’s plenary power.87  This recognition in turn derived 
from a combination of sources consisting of tribal treaties, the 
Constitution, and colonial-era laws and traditions that served the 
purpose of according Native Americans the respect and dignity to 
which self-governing sovereigns are traditionally entitled.88 
B. The Origins, Development & Purpose of State Sovereign 
Immunity 
State sovereign immunity is just what it sounds like: a legal 
doctrine that gives a state the right to avoid being hauled into 
court as a defendant without its consent.89  Similar in many 
respects to the origins of tribal sovereign immunity, the roots of 
state sovereign immunity predate the ratification of the 
Constitution.90  However, unlike tribal sovereign immunity, there 
is no clear consensus among scholars as to the exact 
pre-Constitution source for state immunity.91  Nonetheless, one of 
the most widely accepted theories about state immunity’s origins, 
which the Supreme Court has subscribed to, is that despite 
rejecting most British common law traditions, “the doctrine that 
a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal 
in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”92  
 
87 See id. at 788 (“Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess—
subject, again, to congressional action—is the ‘common-law immunity from suit 
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’ ” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978))). 
88 See supra Section I.A.1. 
89 Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 721 (2002). 
90 See id. at 727; Katherine Florey, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case 
Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1375, 1385–86 (2004). 
91 While many say that the states assumed sovereign immunity from when they 
were colonies as a result of the King’s immunity, see, e.g., Dodson, supra note 89, at 
727; Miles McCann, State Sovereign Immunity, NAGTRI J.: EMERGING ISSUES FOR 
ATT’YS GEN. OFFS., November 2017, at 12, others are skeptical of this theory and 
believe that this was never an assumption of the states. See, e.g., John J. Gibbons, 
The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895–99, 1913 (1983) (arguing that there was no inherent 
understanding that state sovereign immunity existed in colonial America as a 
carryover from Britain and insinuating that the alternative theory that such an 
understanding of immunity was evident during the ratifying conventions is a 
misunderstanding based on “[a] few isolated remarks”). 
92  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. 
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751–52 (2002) (“States, upon ratification of the 
Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal 
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Because there is no clear-cut consensus among scholars, and 
because the Supreme Court has indeed subscribed to the theory 
that the doctrine was inherently carried over from Britain, this 
Note assumes arguendo that this theory is historically accurate.93 
1. The Historical Roots of State Sovereign Immunity 
The British common law accorded the King immunity from 
suit based on the theory that “the King can do no wrong.”94  The 
interpretation of this adage that has been relied on to 
understand sovereign immunity is that unless the British Crown 
consented to suits filed against it, the King was “not amenable to 
any other earthly power or jurisdiction . . . so as to render him 
answerable for [his actions] personally to his people.”95  Although 
the American people rejected many of the legal and political 
principles of England upon declaring their independence,96 they 
simultaneously and universally accepted “the doctrine that a 
sovereign could not be sued without its consent.”97  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has even quoted the Federalist Papers and 
records from state ratifying conventions to support this 
contention.98 
 
Government. Rather, they entered the Union ‘with their sovereignty intact.’ An 
integral component of that ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’ retained by the 
States is their immunity from private suits.” (citations omitted)). 
93 Whether or not the American version of state sovereign immunity truly was 
assumed by the states as a carryover from the Crown is irrelevant to this Note’s 
argument because if this is indeed historically accurate, it would put tribal and state 
sovereign immunity on equal footing, and if it is not actually historically 
accurate⎯and the doctrine was not assumed to exist upon declaring independence—
then it would actually mean tribal sovereign immunity has stronger historical roots 
than state sovereign immunity. 
94 Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 
1201 (2001); McCann, supra note 91, at 12 n.8. 
95 Herbert Broom, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND 
ILLUSTRATED 43 (1845). There is also a second interpretation that means that 
the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury, because it is 
created for the benefit of the people, and, therefore, cannot be exerted to 
their prejudice—it being a fundamental general rule, that the king cannot 
sanction any act forbidden by law; and it is in this point of view that he is 
under, and not above the laws[]—that he is bound by them equally with his 
subjects. 
Id. This interpretation is not, however, the basis of understanding the sovereign 
immunity that British common law stipulated. 
96 Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 1202 (“The United States was founded on a 
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives.”). 
97 Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16. 
98 The Court quoted THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) in stating, 
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
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Despite such universal acceptance of the doctrine when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified, the actual text of the 
Constitution did not acknowledge state sovereign immunity’s 
existence when it was ratified.99  Not surprisingly, this 
constitutional omission quickly became an issue; and five years 
after the Constitution’s ratification, the Supreme Court decided 
Chisholm v. Georgia, where a South Carolina citizen filed suit 
against the state of Georgia.100  In deciding the case, four of the 
five justices found that Georgia was subject to suits brought by 
citizens of other states based on the explicit language of Article 
III of the Constitution.101 
As a direct reaction to the outcome of Chisholm, 
Congressional representatives quickly proposed resolutions for 
an eleventh amendment, and the following year the Eleventh 
Amendment was passed.102  The Eleventh Amendment provides, 
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”103  As a result, the 
amendment effectively overturned Chisholm, although it does 
 
individual without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this 
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States . . . . Id. at 
716–17. The Court then took quotes from the Virginia ratifying convention where 
James Madison said, “[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any state into 
court,” and John Marshall said, “[w]ith respect to disputes between a state and the 
citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual 
vehemence . . . [and i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be 
dragged before a court.” Id. at 717–18. 
99 See generally U.S. CONST. art. III. 
100 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793). 
101 See id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 
469 (opinion of Cushing, J.); id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). More specifically, in 
issuing his opinion, Chief Justice Jay made clear that the Constitution explicitly 
authorized suits between states and citizens of other states and that the Framers 
could not have intended to only authorize such suits where states were plaintiffs 
because this could have easily been expressed. Id. at 476–77. 
102 John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power To Create Causes of 
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436–37 (1975). In fact, the amendment was 
passed by the Senate by a resounding twenty-three to two and by the House of 
Representatives by a resounding eighty-one to nine. Id. However, the amendment 
was not formally announced as law until 1798, due to a slow adoption by some 
states. Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1893–94 (2010). 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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not address whether a state can be sued by one of its own 
citizens.104 
This latter question was addressed by the Supreme Court 
nearly a century after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 
Hans v. Louisiana.105  Here, a Louisiana citizen tried to sue the 
state of Louisiana, claiming the Eleventh Amendment did not 
bar his suit because its text only explicitly bars suits from 
citizens of different states.106  However, realizing that subjecting 
a state to suit by its own citizen and not an out-of-state citizen 
would be a “startling and unexpected” result, the Court relied 
heavily on Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent and the prevailing 
views at the time the Constitution was ratified107 to decide that a 
state may not be sued by its own citizens.108 
Eighteen years after Hans, the Supreme Court expanded on 
state immunity in Ex parte Young.109  In this case, stockholders of 
several railroad companies sued Minnesota’s attorney general in 
his official capacity for enforcing unconstitutional legislation.110  
Addressing the issue, the Court held that state officials who 
enforce legislation that runs afoul of the Constitution are 
amenable to suit for injunctive relief because in doing so “the 
officer . . . comes into conflict with the superior authority of th[e] 
Constitution” and the “state has no power to impart to [the 
official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme 
authority of the United States.”111 
Up to this point the Court and Congress had shown that they 
view the state sovereign immunity doctrine as having strong pre-
Constitutional roots while simultaneously showing that they 
were not afraid to carve out some exceptions when equity 
requires relief for individuals.112  Almost seventy years later, the 
Court expanded upon Congress’s ability to carve out such 
 
104 See id. 
105 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
106 Id. at 10. 
107 See id. at 11–16, 18. The prevailing views at the time the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified are the same views that the Court relies on today to form the 
basis of state sovereign immunity’s historical origins. See supra notes 98–99 and 
accompanying text. 
108 Hans, 134 U.S. at 21. 
109 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
110 Id. at 129–130. 
111 Id. at 159–60 (citing Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)). 
112 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans, 134 U.S. at 21; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
at 159–60. 
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exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment when it decided 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.113 
2. The Modern Interpretation of State Sovereign Immunity 
Fitzpatrick involved amendments to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that were passed by Congress pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.114  The amendments authorized 
individuals to sue states for money damages resulting from 
employee discrimination, and a group of retired male state 
employees filed such a suit against Connecticut state officials.115  
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions 
of [§] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” since that section calls 
for “appropriate legislation” in enforcing the limitations of the 
rest of that amendment.116  Thus, Congress had plenary power 
within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity.117 
Thirteen years later, Fitzpatrick was expanded upon in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., where a plurality of the Court 
found that by authorizing Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce through the Commerce Clause, the Constitution 
implicitly granted Congress the power to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in the pursuit of the regulation of 
commerce.118  However, on the very same day, the Court clarified 
in Dellmuth v. Muth that the standard of articulation required 
for abrogation of state immunity is “unmistakably clear 
[intention] in the language of the statute.”119  While the holding 
 
113 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
114 427 U.S. at 447–48. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, states that  
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that 
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
115 Id. at 448–49. 
116 Id. at 456. 
117 Id. (“We think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate 
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are 
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.” (citations omitted)). 
118 491 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1989). 
119 491 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
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in Dellmuth remains the standard, the Union Gas holding was 
overruled seven years later in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida.120 
Seminole involved the IGRA, enacted pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, which imposed a duty on the states to 
negotiate in good faith with tribes to form a gaming compact and 
unmistakably authorized tribes to file suit against a state for 
breaching that duty.121  In its opinion, the Seminole Court 
articulated two questions that must be asked to determine 
whether state sovereign immunity has been abrogated by 
Congress: “first, whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expresse[d] 
its intent to abrogate the immunity’; and second, whether 
Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’ ”122 
In addressing the first inquiry, the Court determined that 
Congress unquestionably intended to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity through the IGRA.123  As for the second inquiry, the 
Court said that the Act was not passed “pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power.”124  While acknowledging that Union Gas 
unquestionably gave Congress abrogation authority under the 
Commerce Clause, the Court nonetheless ruled that Union Gas 
had no majority rationale or support from established 
jurisprudence and improperly expanded Article III’s 
jurisdictional scope.125  As a result, the Court expressly overruled 
Union Gas and held that state sovereign immunity was not 
validly abrogated under the IGRA.126 
Regarding Seminole, it is important to note that the Court 
acknowledged (1) the deep historical roots and principles of 
 
120 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (“We feel bound to 
conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, 
overruled.”). 
121 Id. at 47. 
122 Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). 
123 Id. at 57. 
124 Id. at 58, 76. 
125 Id. at 62–65. 
126 Id. at 66, 76. Additionally, the Court addressed the alternative argument 
that the Florida Governor may be subjected to the suit through the Ex parte Young 
exception. Id. at 73. Ultimately, the Court held that Ex parte Young was inapplicable 
because (1) the IGRA provided a remedial scheme outside of subjecting a state to 
suit so courts “should hesitate before . . . permitting an action against a state officer 
based upon Ex parte Young,” and (2) “the fact that Congress chose to impose upon 
the State a liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability 
imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that 
Congress had no wish to create the latter under [the IGRA].” Id. at 74–76. 
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sovereignty that are embodied in the Eleventh Amendment;127 
(2) the continued existence of the Ex parte Young exception;128 
(3) the importance of the “unmistakably clear” intention 
standard;129 and (4) the continuing validity of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment abrogation power that was indicated in 
Fitzpatrick.130  However, the Court was not finished clarifying 
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity, as it 
addressed the issue a mere three years later in Alden v. Maine.131 
Alden involved state probation officers filing a suit against 
the state of Maine for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), which authorized private suits against non-consenting 
states in their own courts.132  However, the Court held that such 
authorization was unconstitutional because Article I of the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from subjecting non-consenting 
states to suits in their own courts.133 
In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned that state 
sovereign immunity is not derived from, or limited by, the 
Eleventh Amendment, as it is a “fundamental aspect of the 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of 
the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as 
altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional 
Amendments.”134  Ultimately, the Court thought it would be 
 
127 Id. at 54 (“[E]ach State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; 
and . . . ‘[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of 
an individual without its consent’ [and f]or over a century we have reaffirmed that 
federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by 
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’ ” 
(quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1890)). 
128 See id. at 73–76. 
129 Id. at 55–56. 
130 Id. at 65–66. 
131 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
132 Id. at 711–12. 
133 Id. at 712. 
134 Id. at 712–13. The Court went as far as to say that despite commonly 
referring to state sovereign immunity as “Eleventh Amendment immunity,” this is 
actually a convenient shorthand phrase that does not encapsulate the whole origin 
of the doctrine. Id. Rather, despite the explicit text of the amendment which 
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, “[the Court] ha[s] understood the Eleventh Amendment to 
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it 
confirms.” That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. 
Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our 
federal system; and second, that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.” 
Id. at 729 (ellipsis in original) (citations omitted). 
2019] PATENTLY INCONSISTENT 253 
anomalous for states to be subjected to suit in their own court 
while being shielded from suit in federal court and supported this 
view by looking to “the Constitution’s structure, its history, and 
the [Court’s] authoritative interpretations.”135 
Sticking with a narrow scope in which Congress is 
authorized to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court 
decided Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board 
v. College Savings Bank on the same day as Alden.136  The 
Florida Prepaid case centered around the Patent and Plant 
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy 
Act”), which was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment § 5, and abrogated state sovereign immunity in 
patent infringement and plant variety protection suits.137  The 
goal of the act was to allow infringed upon patent owners to seek 
redress from patent infringing states by preventing states from 
claiming sovereign immunity in infringement suits.138  In 
evaluating whether the act validly abrogated state immunity, the 
Court analyzed the two-step inquiry articulated in Seminole and 
determined that, under the first step, “Congress’ intent to 
abrogate could not have been any clearer.”139  However, Congress 
failed under the second step because it did not act pursuant to a 
valid exercise of power.140 
Although patent rights have long been held a form of 
property141 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
depriving people of property without due process of law,142 the 
Court in Florida Prepaid nonetheless held that the Patent 
Remedy Act was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment § 5.143  
Applying a recently established standard for Fourteenth 
Amendment legislation,144  the Court deemed that since the Act 
did not “identify[] . . . [its] targeted constitutional wrong or 
 
135 Id. at 713, 743, 752–53. 
136 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
137 Id. at 630–32. 
138 Id. at 641–42. 
139 Id. at 635. 
140 Id. at 647. 
141 Id. at 637. 
142 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
143 527 U.S. at 647. 
144 The standard for Fourteenth Amendment legislation was set forth in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, wherein the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, requires “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” 
521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
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evil,”145 its means—that is, abrogation of state immunity in all 
infringement suits—were too broad in proportion to the end it 
was trying to reach—that is, provide recourse for infringed upon 
patent owners.146  As a result, the Patent Remedy Act was 
deemed unconstitutional and the state was immune from suit.147 
Three years after Florida Prepaid, the Court was faced with 
an issue of first impression in Federal Maritime Commission v. 
South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”): whether state 
sovereign immunity applies to agency proceedings.148  In deciding 
the case, the Court set forth the framework for determining 
whether state sovereign immunity applies in administrative 
proceedings.  The Court stated: “we must examine [Federal 
Maritime Commission (“FMC”)] adjudications to determine 
whether they are the type of proceedings from which the Framers 
would have thought the States possessed immunity when they 
agreed to enter the Union” and then proceeded to compare the 
characteristics of FMC administrative adjudications to those of 
civil litigation.149  In applying this standard, the Court held that 
although the FMC is an Article II administrative agency, “the 
similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation are 
overwhelming,” making it hard to “imagine that [the Framers] 
 
145 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646. After reciting City of Boerne’s holding, the 
Florida Prepaid Court stated that City of Boerne requires Congress to both “identify 
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, 
and . . . tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.” Id. at 
639. The Court specifically noted that the deprivation of a protected interest by the 
state is not unconstitutional on its own, but rather the “deprivation of such an 
interest without due process of law” is what is unconstitutional. Id. at 643 (quoting 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Based on this, the Court went on to 
say that it is not patent infringement by the state that is unconstitutional, it is 
patent infringement without provision of a remedy. Id. (citations omitted). Since 
Congress did not address potential state remedies that were available, did not focus 
on specific types of infringement, and did not provide anything in the legislative 
record to indicate that using sovereign immunity to avoid infringement suits was 
widespread, the act was deemed unconstitutional. Id. at 643, 645–47. 
146 Id. at 646 (“[T]he provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are ‘so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’ An 
unlimited range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or 
contributory patent infringement . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
147 Id. at 647–48. 
148 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002). This case involved a cruise ship company that filed 
a complaint against the South Carolina State Ports Authority with the Federal 
Maritime Commission (“FMC”) for violating the Shipping Act of 1984. Id. at 747–48. 
The FMC is an administrative agency whose authority falls under the executive 
branch. Id. at 750. 
149 Id. at 756–59. 
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would have found it acceptable” to subject states to litigation-
esque agency proceedings initiated by a private complaint such 
as FMC adjudications.150  As a result, state sovereign immunity 
protected the state from FMC proceedings.151 
Ten years after FMC, the Court clarified the standard 
required to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment § 5, in 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland.152  In Coleman, a male 
employed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland filed suit against 
the court for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA”).153  The FMLA provided that employees could take up 
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year under certain 
circumstances, and it provided a right to file suit “against any 
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction.”154 
When the petitioner filed suit, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland claimed state sovereign immunity, so the Court had to 
apply the proportional and congruent test from City of Boerne v. 
Flores.155  In applying the test, the Court concluded that while 
the FMLA sought to remedy sexual discrimination, there was no 
evidence to support that states had a pattern of discriminating 
against employees in the application of their medical leave 
policies, which rendered abrogation of state immunity too broad 
of a solution.156  For abrogation to be valid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment § 5, “Congress must identify a pattern of 
constitutional violations and tailor a remedy congruent and 
proportional to the documented violations.”157 
This exploration of the historical origins and development of 
the state sovereign immunity doctrine reveals several 
discernable principles.  The doctrine comes from the idea of 
sovereign immunity that shielded the King from suit in England, 
 
150 Id. at 757–60. However, the Court did explicitly note that the FMC could 
“institute its own administrative proceeding against a state-run port” for Shipping 
Act violations. Id. at 768. Thus, even though the similarities between FMC 
proceedings and civil litigation played a part in the Court’s holding, the holding 
seems to actually rest on the fact that when a complaint is filed with the FMC by a 
private party, the FMC “does not even have the discretion to refuse to adjudicate 
[it].” Id. at 764 (citation omitted). 
151 Id. at 769. 
152 566 U.S. 30 (2012). 
153 Id. at 33–35. 
154 Id. at 34. 
155 Id. at 36; see also supra note 144. 
156 Coleman, 566 U.S. at 37–38, 43. 
157 Id. at 43. 
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and, while the extent of colonial adoption of the doctrine is 
unclear, it was definitely acknowledged by many during the 
Constitution’s ratification process.158  Nonetheless, it was not 
explicitly accounted for in the Constitution and as a result of 
several controversies that addressed this constitutional silence, 
the doctrine now rests upon a combination of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the Constitution’s structure, and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of pre-constitutional common law and 
traditions.159  As a result, the Court has made clear that the 
primary purpose of state sovereign immunity is “to accord States 
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign 
entities.”160 
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and State Sovereign Immunity 
Are Functionally the Same 
Based on the deep historical dives into tribal and state 
sovereign immunity, it may initially appear that state sovereign 
immunity is clearly the stronger legal doctrine, due to its more 
robust constitutional roots.  However, there are principles 
common to the two doctrines that actually place them on 
relatively equal footing.161 
For starters, the two doctrines are strikingly similar to each 
other.  As noted above, both doctrines predate the ratification of 
the Constitution.162  This is noteworthy because with state 
sovereign immunity in particular, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the fact that a state’s immunity is not derived solely 
from the Constitution, but rather from “common-law tradition,” 
which is embodied today by the Constitution.163  Because tribal 
 
158 See supra Section I.B.1. 
159 See supra Section I.B. 
160 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (citing 
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
161 In fact, it has been suggested that tribal sovereign immunity actually has a 
broader reach than state sovereign immunity since tribes cannot be sued by a state, 
but a state can be sued by another state. See William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: 
The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1666 (2013) (“Tribal 
immunity is in certain respects broader than other governments’ immunities . . . .”); 
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 765 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (posing the question: “Why should an Indian tribe enjoy broader 
immunity than the States, the Federal Government, and foreign nations?” when 
discussing the “anomalous” results of the majority’s holding in comparison to the 
other sovereign immunity doctrines). 
162 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
163 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13, 733 (1999). 
2019] PATENTLY INCONSISTENT 257 
sovereign immunity also derives from common law,164 and certain 
principles of tribal sovereignty are embodied in the 
Constitution,165 the Supreme Court’s emphasis on state 
immunity’s common-law origins places the two doctrines on 
similar footing in terms of how the two originated. 
Moreover, tribal immunity protects tribes from suits brought 
by states, and state immunity protects states from suits brought 
by tribes.166  Another similarity is that both doctrines extend to 
officers in their official capacities—except for when Ex parte 
Young applies.167  While these two similarities may seem minor, 
they are key in illustrating the equivalence of these two 
doctrines.  The fact that states and tribes are reciprocally 
immune from suits from each other illustrates that the United 
States does not favor one sovereignty over the other.  The 
immunity of tribal and state officers emphasizes this point 
further because it recognizes the fact that government officers 
are vital to maintaining self-government, which is an important 
aspect of sovereignty.168  By according both tribal and state 
officers immunity, United States law and policy illustrate that 
the self-government—and thus the sovereignty—of both tribes 
and states are valued. 
On the other hand, the differences between the two doctrines 
are insignificant when placed under a microscope.  One main 
point that scholars have brought up to distinguish state 
sovereign immunity from tribal sovereign immunity is the fact 
that Congress has plenary power to abrogate tribal immunity, 
while up to this point Congress has only been permitted to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the limitations of 
 
164 See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986). 
165 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
166 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“We have 
repeatedly held that Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suits by States, as it 
would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to 
which they were not even parties. But if the convention could not surrender the 
tribes’ immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered 
the States’ immunity for the benefit of the tribes.” (citation omitted)). 
167 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 
How.) 362, 374 (1850). 
168 See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998) 
(indicating that Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity because it 
wanted to promote tribal self-sufficiency (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991)). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment § 5.169  Although this is a valid point, 
so long as Congress enacts “ ‘appropriate’ legislation” that is 
proportional and congruent, and addresses an area that is 
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, it may abrogate state 
sovereign immunity.170  And, as we have seen in the past, 
Congress can masterfully enact legislation that is arguably 
somewhat attenuated from the enumerated power under which it 
was passed.171 
More to the point, and relevant for present purposes, 
Congress apparently has the ability to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity with regard to certain types of patent infringement—
direct, incidental, contributory—which can impact inter partes 
review proceedings.172  As stated in Florida Prepaid and recently 
reconfirmed by the Supreme Court, patent rights are property.173  
Because they are property, if the state infringes on an 
individual’s patent and then tries to avoid an infringement suit 
by claiming sovereign immunity, the patent owner would be 
deprived of his or her property without due process of law.174  
This would violate the Fourteenth Amendment § 1, which in turn 
would allow Congress to pass “appropriate legislation” under § 5 
 
169 See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, 
“Accident,” and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 765, 783 (2008) (pointing out that the main difference between state 
and tribal sovereign immunity is that tribal immunity can be abrogated by Congress 
at will, while state sovereign immunity cannot); Jeff M. Kosseff, Sovereignty for 
Profits: Courts’ Expansion of Sovereign Immunity to Tribe-Owned Businesses, 5 FLA. 
A&M U. L. REV. 131, 148 (2009) (noting that Congress is very limited in its ability to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but it does not have the same limitations in its 
ability to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity and Patent Law, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law/. 
170 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 637–38 (1999). 
171 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which aimed to prohibit 
discrimination, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and, in doing so, it conveniently 
construed the words of the Commerce Clause to interrelate discrimination and 
interstate commerce so that the act could pass constitutional muster. See Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
172 See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–48 (implying that had Congress narrowed 
the coverage of the Patent Remedy Act it would have been valid legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5). 
173 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1379 (2018) (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that 
patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings 
Clause.” (citations omitted)); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 (“Patents, however, have 
long been considered a species of property.” (citations omitted)). 
174 See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637, 642–643. 
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of that Amendment.175  Thus, within the ambit of this Note, both 
doctrines are vulnerable to congressional abrogation. 
Regardless, while there are concededly many fewer 
restrictions on Congress’s power to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity than with respect to state sovereign immunity, the 
most important point to note in this analysis is that Congress has 
only abrogated tribal immunity in the limited context of certain 
classes of suits, and, as a whole, the tribal sovereign immunity 
doctrine has mostly been left undisturbed by Congress.176  Thus, 
the argument that Congress could abrogate tribal immunity 
more easily fails because, until Congress acts, the argument is 
mere conjecture.  Moreover, even if Congress were to absolutely 
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, the standard of articulation 
would be the same for tribes as it is for states: clear and 
unequivocal expression of intent.177 
One more key difference that is hard to ignore is that while 
states are amenable to suits filed by other states, they may not 
sue tribes.178  This is because upon discussion at the ratifying 
conventions, states agreed to waive their immunity against each 
other upon entering the union; tribes on the other hand were not 
 
175 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5; see also Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642, 646–
48 (noting that there is “no reason why Congress might not legislate 
against . . . deprivation [of patent rights] without due process under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” and indicating that the Patent Remedy Act would have 
been valid had it been more narrowly tailored). 
176 Gregory J. Wong, Intent Matters: Assessing Sovereign Immunity for Tribal 
Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 211–12 (2007) (“Although Congress may waive tribal 
sovereign immunity, it has only chosen to do so in limited classes of suits. For 
example, Congress has chosen to expose tribes to suit in the areas of mandatory 
liability insurance and gaming activities.”). 
177 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790  (2014) (“[T]o 
abrogate [tribal] immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that purpose.” 
(quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 
411, 418 (2001)); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011) (stating that “our 
precedents require” unequivocal expression to subject states to suit). 
178 See supra note 161. While the tribal sovereign immunity cases that have 
been analyzed in this Note have not addressed whether Native American tribes may 
sue other Native American tribes in federal court, the likely presumption is that 
they cannot since “federally recognized tribes are immune from suit by any entity or 
individual, other than the United States, absent their consent or congressional 
abrogation” and different tribes are considered separate entities from one another. 
Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, ADVOC. (IDAHO), May 2007, at 19, 
19; see also Bart J. Freedman et al., Exploring Tribal Sovereign Immunity with 
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privy to the ratifying conventions and thus “it would be absurd to 
suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity [from suits 
brought by states] in a convention to which they were not even 
parties.”179  This is the only area in which one doctrine trumps 
the other, and the result of this difference is that tribal sovereign 
immunity actually has a somewhat broader reach than the state 
doctrine.180 
Nonetheless, the two doctrines serve the same purpose with 
regard to their respective sovereigns.  While the Supreme Court 
has explicitly stated that the primary purpose of state sovereign 
immunity is “to accord States the dignity that is consistent with 
their status as sovereign entities,”181 this principle is implicit for 
tribal immunity.  Within that statement by the Court is an 
implication that there is a certain level of dignity that all 
sovereign entities deserve. 
Additionally, Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist 
No. 81 that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS 
CONSENT.”182  Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that “Indian tribes . . . exercise ‘inherent sovereign 
authority’ ” and “[a]mong the core aspects of sovereignty that 
tribes possess . . . is the ‘common-law immunity from suit 
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.’ ”183  Thus, it is implied 
that the primary purpose of tribal sovereign immunity is to 
accord tribes “the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities.”184  As a result, it can be said that despite 
somewhat different historical roots, tribal and state sovereign 
immunity serve the same purpose and are functionally the same, 
with the tribal version having a slightly broader reach than the 
state version. 
 
179 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991). 
180 See supra note 161. 
181 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (citing 
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). 
182 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
183 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (first quoting 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 
509 (1991); then quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). 
184 Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505). To 
bring this argument full circle, as mentioned earlier, the original recognition of 
tribal sovereignty came from Francisco de Victoria’s view that tribes deserved to be 
treated with the respect that sovereign nations deserved, which was widely 
embraced and eventually adopted by the Supreme Court. See supra notes 23–24, 27 
and accompanying text. 
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II. THE PATENT SYSTEM, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND 
INTER PARTES REVIEW 
A. Historical Overview and Purpose of the Patent System 
The recognition of patents as an essential tool of society has 
existed since before the United States was founded.185  In fact, 
the first known patent system was established in Venice through 
the Venetian Senate’s 1474 Act.186  Eventually, the idea of the 
patent system spread throughout Europe and in due course was 
introduced to the American colonies.187 
Upon declaring independence, the colonists recognized the 
importance of having a national patent system.188  As such, the 
Framers provided for an American patent system in the United 
States Constitution.189  The Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”190  The plain 
words of this clause state the purpose of having a patent 
system.191  That is, the patent system is formed for the purpose of 
stimulating individuals to make advancements in science and the 
arts so that society can benefit from the new knowledge and 
processes that are created.192 
As the utilitarian theory suggests, “absent patent protection 
inventors will not have sufficient incentive to invest in creating, 
developing, and marketing new products.”193  The patent system 
is created to provide patent protection for a limited time period194 
 
185 See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 156 (2018). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 156–57. 
188 Id. at 157. 
189 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
190 Id. 
191 See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External 
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339–40 (2012) (discussing the purpose of the 
Intellectual Property Clause and stating that the “natural reading of this 
clause . . . is that Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts using solely the specified means”—that is, by giving authors and 
inventors the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time). 
192 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 167. 
193 Id. 
194 In the United States, patents are protected for twenty years from the date 
the patent application was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). 
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to motivate inventors to come up with innovative new products 
and processes that are revealed to the public to benefit society.195  
In essence, the patent system provides for a quid pro quo 
between inventors and society as a whole: the inventor gets a 
limited monopoly over his or her invention and society reaps the 
benefits that come from disclosure of the invention’s 
advancements.196 
When an invention is patented, the patent is then considered 
the inventor’s property,197 but the rights that come along with 
that property are unlike most forms of property.198  As 
mentioned, patent rights are limited in time.  In addition, 
patents only give the patent holder, or “patentee,” the right to 
exclude others from using the patented device, and, therefore, it 
is often described as a negative right.199  Because of the 
exclusionary nature of patents, there are stringent requirements 
that must be met to get an invention patented.200 
As designated in the Constitution, the power to set these 
requirements rests solely in the hands of Congress.201  Over the 
years, Congress has passed various major acts to govern and to 
ensure the efficiency of the patent system.202  The very first 
patent statute was passed by Congress in 1790, but due to issues 
with administrative efficiency and a high bar for inventors, the 
act was quickly superseded three years later by the Patent Act of 
 
195 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 167. 
196 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo 
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly 
is the benefit derived by the public from an invention . . . .”); see also Andersen, 
supra note 62, at 333 (“The ‘essential tension,’ of the U.S. patent system is that it is 
designed to encourage the societal benefit of innovation by dolling [sic] out the 
individual reward of exclusive rights to an invention.”); Bruce Day & Mike 
Martinez, The Roots of Intellectual Property: Trade Secrets, Patents, Trademarks 
and Copyrights, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Jan. 1993, at 30, 32 (“The quid pro quo for this 
right is that the patentee must make a full disclosure of the inventions to the public 
so that the public will be able to practice or use the invention when the patent 
expires.”). 
197 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1379 (2018); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999). 
198 Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 321, 322 (2009). 
199 Id. 
200 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Day & 
Martinez, supra note 196, at 33; Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret 
Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 25 (2008). 
201 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
202 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 157–60. 
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1793.203  The 1793 Act switched the patent system from an 
examination system, whereby patent examiners examined 
inventions before the initial patent grant, to a registration 
system, whereby inventors obtained patents by merely 
registering their inventions—but the validity of such patents was 
then left to the mercy of the federal courts’ interpretation of the 
1793 statute to determine validity when the patents were 
challenged.204 
Although the 1793 Act resulted in some useful 
interpretations by jurists,205 the exclusive reliance on courts to 
determine patent validity led to uncertainty in the patent 
realm206 and caused people to lose faith in the patent system.207  
As a result, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1836, which 
switched the American patent system back to an examination 
system.208  However, this time around the examination system 
incorporated full-time professional examiners, which helped to 
avoid the administrative inefficiency that was suffered under the 
1790 Act.209 
Under the 1836 Act, the patent system grew exponentially 
and there were many important developments in the system 
through the common law.210  But eventually, that growth and 
development slowed due to a widespread distrust of big business 
and monopolies,211 which resulted in an “anti-patent bias on the 
Supreme Court.”212  Such bias caused the Court to require a high 
bar for patentability and led Congress to enact the Patent Act of 
1952.213 
The Patent Act of 1952 took a fair amount of discretion away 
from the courts by codifying specific standards to allow for 
consistency within the patent system.214  For example, the 1952 
 
203 Id. at 157–58. 
204 Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest 
Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 143, 151–52 (2011). 
205 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 158–59. 
206 See Morris & Nard, supra note 204, at 151. 
207 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 159. 
208 Id. 
209 Id.; see also Morriss & Nard, supra note 204, at 160 (discussing additional 
changes to the patent system following the enactment of the 1836 Act). 
210 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 159; Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms 
and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 69–70 (2010). 
211 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 160. 
212 Nard, supra note 210, at 72. 
213 See id. at 72–73. 
214 See id. 
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Act specifically set forward the requirements that are to be met 
in order for an invention to be patentable: (1) subject matter,215 
(2) utility,216 (3) novelty,217 (4) nonobviousness,218 and 
(5) disclosure.219  Additionally, the act codified the standard for 
patent infringement,220 which ironically had been left up to the 
courts up to that point.221  And while a full description of all of 
the 1952 Act’s provisions is outside the scope of this Note, it is 
worth mentioning that certain provisions of the Act still serve as 
the foundation of the current patent system despite a more 
recent enactment by Congress.222 
Before touching upon the most recent congressional 
enactment in patent law, however, it is pertinent to the 
background of this Note to mention the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982.223  The Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982 was enacted by Congress to create the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for the purpose of 
unifying the nation’s laws in certain areas of practice, one of 
which was patent law.224  In creating the Federal Circuit, the act 
merged the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
with the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims 
and vested exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in the 
Federal Circuit.225 
B. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and Inter Partes 
Review 
More recently, Congress has passed the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (“America Invents Act” or “AIA”).226  The 
 
215 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. § 102(a). 
218 Id. § 103. 
219 Id. § 112(a)–(b). 
220 See id. § 271. 
221 See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 
35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476, 476–77 (1953). 
222 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 169. 
223 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
224 See 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 185, at 160; Richard H. Seamon, The 
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
543, 577–78 (2003). 
225 Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc. 
uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction (last visited July 7, 2019). 
226 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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AIA’s legislative history indicates that its purpose is “to ensure 
that the patent system in the 21st century reflects the 
constitutional imperative. . . . The legislation is designed to 
establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that 
will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and 
counterproductive litigation costs.”227  Additionally, the Act has 
shifted the American patent system more in line with the 
systems of other nations, which has assisted in harmonizing 
international patent law.228 
In carrying out its purpose, the AIA implemented various 
features that were new to American patent law.  The most 
prominent of these new provisions is the updated wording of 
35 U.S.C. § 102, which changes the patent system from a first-to-
invent system toward more of a first-to-file system.229  Essentially 
this has made it so the first person to file a valid patent 
application for an invention is granted the patent rights, with a 
few important exceptions, whereas the old system aimed to give 
the patent to the first person to actually invent the invention, 
regardless of who filed first.230 
Among the many other changes that the AIA made to the 
patent system was the introduction of a new form of agency-level 
post-grant review proceeding, the inter partes review.231  IPRs 
consist of a proceeding that is instituted by the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board232 upon petition by a third party and a finding that 
“there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail 
with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the 
petition.”233  If instituted, the PTAB reviews the “patentability of 
 
227 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
228 Albert Tramposch, The Global Impact of the America Invents Act, WIPO 
MAG., Dec. 2011, at 6, 6, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/ 
en/pdf/2011/wipo_pub_121_2011_06.pdf. 
229 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Susanne Hollinger, The America Invents Act—
Overview and Implications, ACS MED. CHEMISTRY LETTERS, Feb. 21, 2012, at 174, 
174; Jing Wang et al., Comparison of United States AIA First-Inventor-to-File with 
Chinese First-to-File, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 251, 253 (2013). 
230 See Wang et al., supra note 229, at 252–53; Hollinger, supra note 229. The 
distinctions between the first-to-file and the first-to-invent systems are not relevant 
to this Note, but it is worth briefly mentioning the change as a key aspect of the AIA 
for the purpose of giving the reader an overview of patent law. 
231 See 35 U.S.C. § 311; see also Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New 
Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 114–15 (2015) 
(explaining the AIA’s introduction of IPRs to replace IPXs). 
232 The PTAB was established by the America Invents Act and codified in Title 
35 of the United States Code. See 35 U.S.C. § 6. 
233 Id. § 314(a). 
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one of more claims in [the challenged] patent only on a ground 
that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103, and only on the basis of 
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”234 
While considered a new form of post-grant proceeding, IPR 
proceedings are a reformed version of the now defunct inter 
partes reexamination (“IPX”) proceeding.235  Like IPR 
proceedings, IPX proceedings allowed third parties to request the 
USPTO to reexamine the validity of issued patents.236  However, 
the standard for instituting a proceeding was lower for IPXs than 
they are for IPRs.237  Additionally, IPXs had no timetable for 
resolution,238 whereas IPRs must be resolved within one year of 
instituting the review.239  And while there are several other 
discrepancies between the two proceedings, it is enough for 
present purposes to point out that the IPR was created to 
alleviate clear inadequacies of the IPX and to provide more 
efficient means of challenging patents and avoiding litigation.240 
Indeed, the USPTO requires an efficient safeguard for its 
patent-issuing process, as it currently receives over 600,000 
patent applications per year.241  As a result of such a high 
 
234 Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review 
(last visited July 13, 2019); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (providing petitioners the 
ability to challenge patent claims based on Section 102 or 103 grounds). 
235 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 281–
82 (2016); Kapadia, supra note 231, at 115; Jason Kornmehl, Ericsson, Inc. v. 
Regents of the University of Minnesota and a New Frontier for the Waiver by 
Litigation Conduct Doctrine, 2018 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018). 
236 MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 11 (1E ed. 2009), 
https://www.ipo.org//wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Inter_Partes_Reexamination.pdf 
(last visited Jul. 13, 2019). 
237 See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 118 (“The original IPX proceeding had a 
lower standard . . . where ‘a substantial new question of patentability’ [was] 
required.”). Compare SMITH, supra note 236, at 12 (“The Examiner decides whether 
the request raises a ‘substantial new question of patentability’, [sic] and if so, begins 
an inter partes reexamination proceeding.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director 
may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of 
the claims challenged in the petition.”). 
238 See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 116. 
239 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
240 See Kapadia, supra note 231, at 115; Joel Sayres & Julie Wahlstrand, To 
Stay or Not to Stay Pending IPR? That Should Be A Simpler Question, CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. | PTAB B. ASS’N., Apr. 2018, at 52, 52 n.2 (quoting various 
congressional reports to illustrate the deficiencies of IPX and the purpose of adding 
the IPR). 
241 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 179 tbl.2 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
USPTOFY18PAR.pdf. 
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demand, examiners at the Patent Office face unrealistic 
pressures to make a decision on each patent application, which 
leads to erroneous patent grants and can ultimately undermine 
the integrity of the patent system.242  Thus, IPR proceedings act 
as a backstop for erroneously issued patents by allowing the 
PTAB to take a closer second look at patents243 and letting the 
public know that they can trust the USPTO and have confidence 
in the patent system.244 
C. Oil States: The Constitutionality of Inter Partes Review 
Despite the efficiency and safeguarding functions that IPR 
proceedings are intended to provide for the USPTO, IPRs have 
been challenged on constitutional grounds several times since 
they replaced IPX proceedings.245  The most recent challenge 
came in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Group, LLC, where the petitioner, Oil States, argued that IPRs 
run afoul of Article III of the Constitution.246 
In relevant part,247 Oil States argued that: (1) patent rights 
are private property rights, as opposed to public rights under the 
public-rights doctrine, and thus mandate resolution in an Article 
III court;248 (2) IPRs “violate[] the ‘general’ principle that 
‘Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty” ’ ” since English courts 
heard patent validity challenges at common law during the 
eighteenth century;249 and (3) IPRs violate Article III because 
they share “every salient characteristic associated with the 
exercise of the judicial power.”250 
 
242 Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
243 The second time around usually affords examiners the opportunity to look at 
prior art that was “not known or available to the PTO” at the time of the initial 
examination. Id. at 1331. 
244 Id. at 1332–33. 
245 See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); MCM Portfiolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
246 138 S. Ct. at 1372. 
247 Oil States made an argument that IPRs violate the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury, but this argument is irrelevant to this Note and the Court was 
unpersuaded by this argument. Id. at 1379. 
248 Id. at 1375–76. 
249 Id. at 1376 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011)). 
250 Id. at 1378. 
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In response to Oil States’ first argument, the Supreme Court 
held that patent grants are “a matter involving public rights” and 
thus IPRs fall “squarely within the public-rights doctrine.”251  The 
Court reasoned that when the government grants patents, it 
takes valuable information from the public and gives it to the 
inventor to the exclusion of everybody else; thus, it is a matter 
“between ‘the public . . . and . . . the patentee.’ ”252  The 
Constitution sanctions patent grants, and IPRs merely involve 
retracing the steps of granting the patent to ensure an efficient 
patent system.253  The Court then went on to state that because 
patents are granted subject to reexamination by the PTO, and 
such a qualification is authorized for public rights “franchises,” 
the public-rights doctrine covers matters for inter partes 
review.254 
The Court then addressed Oil States’ second argument 
regarding the English common law.255  Ultimately, the Court 
determined that patent validity is not a matter that “from its 
nature” requires resolution by a court because although this was 
common under English law, England also had other methods of 
resolving these matters that resembled IPR.256  This reasoning 
illustrates that conditioning patent grants on the ability to 
reexamine them at a later time was not unusual, even if 
adjudication was the traditional method of resolution.257 
Finally, in addressing Oil States’ comparison of IPRs to 
litigation, the Court noted that (1) it “has never adopted a ‘looks 
like’ test” to decide whether Article III has been violated, 
(2) “[t]he fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not 
necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power,” and 
(3) “[a]lthough inter partes review includes some of the features 
of adversarial litigation,” it is not binding on the parties involved 
as to ultimate infringement liability.258  As such, the Court held 
that IPRs are constitutional as they remain a public-rights 
matter and do not require a judicial determination by an 
 
251 Id. at 1373. 
252 Id. at 1373–74 (second elipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Duell, 
172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899)). 
253 Id. at 1374–75. 
254 Id. 
255 See id. at 1376–78. 
256 Id. at 1376–77 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011)). 
257 Id. at 1377–78. 
258 Id. at 1378 (first citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); then 
citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). 
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Article III court.259  In practical terms, this holding means that 
patent holders will continue to find innovative ways to avoid IPR 
proceedings. 
III. THE INTRA-CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
AND THE PTAB 
Indeed, since the inception of inter partes review proceedings 
there have been various instances of patentees attempting to 
avoid the proceedings.260  While some of these instances have 
been unsuccessful for patentees,261 there have also been several 
instances of patentee success.262  In particular, the PTAB has 
faced several assertions of sovereign immunity to avoid IPRs, 
and it has been inconsistent in how it treats the tribal doctrine 
compared to the state version.263  To make matters worse, until 
the recent LSI Corp. decision264 the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit had only added to this inconsistency.265  As it 
currently stands, this inconsistency has been resolved, but 
 
259 Id. 
260 See id. at 1372 (challenging the constitutionality of IPRs); Mylan II, 896 F.3d 
1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claiming tribal sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1547 (2019); MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (challenging the constitutionality of IPRs); LSI Corp. v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 
2017) (claiming state sovereign immunity); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) (same); 
Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 
2992429, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017) (same); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. 
IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *1 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017) (same); 
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 
4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (same). 
261 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379; Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329; MCM Portfolio, 
812 F.3d at 1292. 
262 See NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *31; Covidien, 2017 WL 
4015009, at *17. 
263 Compare Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb 23, 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to IPRs 
because, among other things, unlike civil litigation “inter partes review proceeding[s 
are] not the type of ‘suit’ to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy 
immunity under the common law” (citation omitted)), with Covidien, 2017 WL 
4015009, at *11 (holding that state sovereign immunity applies to IPRs because, 
among other things, “the considerable resemblance between [inter partes review and 
civil litigation] is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the States by the 
Eleventh Amendment”). 
264 See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
265 See Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1327, 1329 (holding that tribal sovereign immunity 
does not apply to IPRs because IPRs are “more like an agency enforcement action 
than a civil suit”). 
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should the Supreme Court grant ceriorari and reverse the LSI 
Corp. decision, the inconsistency will be revived.266 
A. State Sovereign Immunity at the PTAB 
In 2016, Covidien LP filed IPR petitions against three 
patents owned by the University of Florida Research Foundation 
Inc. (“UFRF”), and, in response, UFRF immediately moved to 
dismiss the petitions on the basis of state sovereign immunity.267  
In addressing the issue, the PTAB applied the framework set 
forward by the Supreme Court in FMC268 that is used to 
determine whether sovereign immunity applies to agency 
proceedings.269  In doing so, the PTAB reasoned that, among 
other things, IPRs are adversarial, are initiated by a third party, 
share similar rules and procedures with civil litigation, and have 
judges with similar roles to Article III judges.270  As a result of 
such similarities, the PTAB held that state sovereign immunity 
shields state patent owners from IPR.271 
In so holding, the PTAB acknowledged the negative 
consequences that could result from shielding state-owned 
patents from review but nonetheless held that precluding IPRs 
against the states was “precisely the point of the Eleventh 
 
266 LSI Corp., 926 F.3d at 1342; Rizzolo & Tsui, supra note 14. 
267 Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1. UFRF’s basis for claiming state sovereign 
immunity is that it is an arm of the state of Florida because it is part of the 
University of Florida. Id. at *2. 
268 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002); see 
also supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text. 
269 Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *3–5, *8–11. 
270 Id. at *9–10. It is worth noting that the PTAB’s rationale for holding that 
state sovereign immunity is allowed as a defense in IPRs in part because IPRs share 
similar rules and procedures with civil litigation is seemingly at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Oil States that the “fact that an agency uses court-like 
procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power.” Compare 
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *9–11, with Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. 
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018). To some extent, the 
Supreme Court must have recognized this tension as it explicitly stated that its 
holding in Oil States was narrow and was only meant to address the 
constitutionality of IPRs. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court chose not to address the issue when it denied Allergan and the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe’s petition for certiorari, which addressed the issue in the petition, on 
April 15, 2019. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc. (Mylan III), 139 
S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31, Mylan III, 139 S. Ct. 1547 
(No. 18-899). 
271 Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (“On the whole, considering the nature of 
inter partes review and civil litigation, we conclude that the considerable 
resemblance between the two is sufficient to implicate the immunity afforded to the 
States by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
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Amendment.”272  Further, the board defended its acceptance of 
these consequences by stating that Congress did not express 
unequivocal intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.273  
Calling on the Supreme Court’s Florida Prepaid rationale that 
“Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the 
States,” the board held that there is no evidence that allowing 
state sovereign immunity in IPRs will regularly allow wrongly 
issued, state-owned patents to be shielded from review.274 
Shortly after the PTAB decided Covidien, it decided 
NeoChord, Inc. v. University of Maryland, which involved yet 
another assertion of the state sovereign immunity defense in an 
IPR.275  While this proceeding was essentially identical to the 
Covidien IPR, there were a few minor differences that caused the 
PTAB to treat NeoChord as an issue of first impression.276 
One difference that the PTAB noted was the different 
procedural posture as compared to Covidien. While the sovereign 
immunity defense was raised almost immediately in Covidien, 
the defense here was not raised until right before an oral hearing 
in front of the board.277  This difference was key to NeoChord’s 
argument as it claimed that the university implicitly waived its 
sovereign immunity by delaying its assertion of the defense and 
participating in the proceeding up to that point.278  However, the 
PTAB was unconvinced by this argument as it cited to Supreme 
Court precedent indicating that state sovereign immunity is a 
defense that can be raised at any time.279  NeoChord also argued 
that Covidien did not govern this case because the university 
licensed out its patent rights to a third party and thus it was a 
dispensable party to the proceeding.280  However, this argument 
was also unavailing as the university still retained substantive 




274 Id. at *12 (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999)). 
275 No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *3–4 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 
2017). 
276 See id. at *6. 
277 Id. at *21. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at *22–23 
280 Id. at *29. 
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indispensable.281  While these differences between the two 
proceedings played a part in the PTAB’s NeoChord holding, the 
crux of the PTAB’s holding came in the same form of the FMC 
framework with an ultimate determination that IPRs resemble 
civil litigation.282  As such, the board once again held that state 
sovereign immunity could be asserted to avoid IPR 
proceedings.283 
Nearly two months later, the PTAB decided Reactive 
Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corporation, which once 
again involved a state patentee using state sovereign immunity 
as an IPR defense.284  This proceeding involved a patent that was 
co-owned by both Toyota Motor Corp. and the Regents of the 
University of Minnesota (the “Regents”), the latter of which is an 
arm of the state of Minnesota.285  Based on the state sovereign 
immunity claim by the Regents, the PTAB once again went 
through the FMC analysis and held that the similarities between 
IPR proceedings and litigation warrant the application of state 
sovereign immunity in IPRs.286  As a result, the Regents were 
able to avoid the IPR proceeding.287 
However, this was not the end of the PTAB’s analysis, as the 
patent was co-owned by Toyota, which is a private corporation.288  
Since Toyota and the Regents owned equal rights in the patent 
and were represented by the same legal counsel, the PTAB 
determined that the Regents were not an indispensable party 
and the proceeding could continue without the Regents.289  Thus, 
state sovereign immunity was successful in shielding the 
Regents, but it was not sufficient to shield the patent itself from 
the proceeding.290 
The next two board decisions, which also involved patents 
owned by the Regents, were resolved on the same day and 
present an exception to the PTAB’s application of state sovereign 
 
281 Id. at *29–31. This indispensable-party reasoning later became part of the 
PTAB’s rationale in Mylan I. See No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13–15 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). 
282 See NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *5–14. 
283 Id. at *31. 
284 Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 
WL 2992429, at *1 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017). 
285 Id. at *1, *5. 
286 Id. at *2–3. 
287 Id. at *5. 
288 See id. 
289 Id. at *5–7. 
290 Id. at *7. 
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immunity.291  These two proceedings, LSI Corp. v. Regents of the 
University of Minnesota and Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the 
University of Minnesota, were both decided by the same PTAB 
judge, Chief Administrative Patent Judge Ruschke, and both 
involved waiver of state sovereign immunity.292  Specifically, both 
decisions involved the Regents filing an action for patent 
infringement and the alleged infringer responding by petitioning 
the PTAB for an IPR proceeding for the same patent.293  Because 
of the identical procedural postures, the board issued decisions in 
both proceedings that are nearly mirror images of each other.294 
Although we have seen that state sovereign immunity 
applies in IPRs, the board ultimately determined that because 
the Regents had filed patent infringement suits for the patents in 
question in both proceedings, it had waived its sovereign 
immunity from IPRs for those patents.295  In reaching these 
holdings, the PTAB reasoned that the key inquiry is whether or 
not allowing state sovereign immunity claims would cause 
“unfairness and inconsistency” and allow the state to “achieve a 
litigation advantage.”296  IPR petitions are similar to compulsory 
counterclaims because petitions for IPR of a specific patent must 
be filed within one year of an infringement suit.297  Thus, 
allowing a state to file an infringement suit, triggering the 
statute of limitations for an IPR petition, and then to assert 
immunity from the resulting IPR petition would provide the 
Regents with an unfair litigation advantage.298  Because such a 
result would cause “substantial unfairness and inconsistency,” 
the PTAB carved out a waiver exception for state sovereign 
immunity in IPRs.299  It is worth noting that on February 13, 
2018, the Regents of the University of Minnesota appealed the 
 
291 See generally LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 
2017 WL 6517562 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Minn., No. IPR2017-01186, 2017 WL 6517563 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017). 
292 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *1; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *1. 
293 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3. 
294 See generally LSI, 2017 WL 6517562; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563. 
295 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4. 
296 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002)); Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (citing 
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620). 
297 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *3. 
298 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *3 (citations omitted); Ericsson, 2017 WL 
6517563, at *3 (citations omitted). 
299 LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (citing Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620); Ericsson, 
2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (citing Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620). 
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PTAB’s LSI and Ericsson decisions to the Federal Circuit.300  The 
appeals were consolidated, and on June 14, 2019, the Federal 
Circuit held that state sovereign immunity may not be applied in 
IPRs and the Regents of the University of Minnesota plans to file 
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.301 
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the PTAB 
Despite the PTAB’s continual willingness to declare that 
state sovereign immunity applies in IPR proceedings, the board 
was highly reluctant to declare the same for tribal sovereign 
immunity when it first decided the issue in Mylan I on February 
23, 2018.302 
1. The Lead-Up to the PTAB’s Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Decision 
In 2015, Allergan Inc., a pharmaceutical company owning 
several patents relating to an Allergan product known as 
Restasis, which is used to treat “chronic dry eye” symptoms,303 
filed suit against Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Akorn, Inc. (collectively, “the 
Infringers”) for infringing its Restasis patents.304  In response, 
Mylan—and, subsequently, Teva and Akorn—petitioned the 
PTAB for IPRs against the Restasis patents and the PTAB 
instituted the IPR proceedings.305 
Allergan countered the board’s decision to institute these 
proceedings by entering into a strategic transaction with the 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (the “Tribe”) several days before the 
scheduled oral hearing date for the IPRs.306  As a result of this 
 
300 See Petition for Review/Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit by Regents of the University of Minnesota, Regents 
of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1559); 
Petition for Review / Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit by Regents of the University of Minnesota, LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1560). 
301 LSI Corp., 926 F.3d at 1342; University of Minnesota’s Motion to Stay at 3, 
Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-
1559). 
302 See No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) 
(citations omitted). 




306 Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1. 
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transaction, Allergan transferred its rights in the challenged 
Restasis patents and related patent applications to the Tribe, 
and the Tribe subsequently licensed the patent rights back to 
Allergan.307  The license agreement granted Allergan “an 
irrevocable, perpetual, transferrable and exclusive license” to the 
patents, and in return, the Tribe received $13.75 million up front 
and $15 million annually during the license’s royalty term.308 
Furthermore, the assignment and license agreements 
specified the rights and obligations of Allergan and the Tribe as 
to infringement suits and maintenance of the patents and 
included a provision that explicitly provided that the Tribe did 
not waive its right to tribal sovereign immunity.309  On the very 
same day, the Tribe contacted the PTAB to file a motion to 
dismiss the IPRs on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.310 
2. The PTAB’s Tribal Sovereign Immunity Decision 
In deciding whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to 
IPRs, the PTAB made clear that there was no controlling 
precedent for the issue.311  Although the Tribe cited to the 
Supreme Court’s FMC decision, the PTAB was unpersuaded, 
reasoning that there is no “federal court or Board precedent 
suggesting that FMC’s holding with respect to state sovereign 
immunity can or should be extended to an assertion of tribal 
immunity in similar federal administrative proceedings.”312  The 
board also reasoned that there are differences between the state 
and tribal doctrines that indicate tribal immunity should not 
apply to IPRs.313 
Furthermore, the board stated that because the patent 
statutes are generally applicable, they apply equally to Indian 
tribes.314  In support of this proposition, the PTAB relied on a 
nonbinding Ninth Circuit test that delineated exceptions for 
when generally applicable statutes do not apply to Indian 
tribes.315  In doing so, the PTAB ignored Supreme Court 
 
307 Id. at *2–3. 
308 Id. at *3. 
309 Id. at *2–3. 
310 Id. at *1. 
311 Id. at *3–4. 
312 Id. at *3. 
313 Id. at *4. 
314 Id. at *4–5. 
315 Id. at *5 (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 
1116 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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precedent that states “[t]he baseline position, we have often held, 
is tribal immunity; and ‘to abrogate such immunity, Congress 
must “unequivocally” express that purpose.’ ”316 
Ultimately, the PTAB implicitly engaged in the FMC 
assessment that it explicitly dismissed as inapplicable to tribal 
immunity.317  The board reasoned that unlike civil litigation, 
IPRs do not involve a petitioner seeking a form of relief, do not 
require the board to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
patentee, do not require the patentee’s participation, and instead 
allow a final determination by the board regardless of a 
settlement between the parties.318  In light of these differences, 
the PTAB was of the opinion that tribal sovereign immunity 
could not terminate an IPR proceeding.319 
The board then went on to reason that “[e]ven assuming 
arguendo that the Tribe [was] entitled to assert immunity, 
termination of the[] proceedings [was] not warranted” because 
the license agreements “transferred ‘all substantial rights’ in the 
challenged patents back to Allergan.”320  As a result, the Tribe 
was not an indispensable party, so even if tribal sovereign 
immunity applied, the proceedings could continue without the 
Tribe’s presence.321 
3. The Federal Circuit Decision 
After the PTAB issued its decision on February 23, 2018, the 
Tribe and Allergan appealed the decision to the Federal 
Circuit.322  In deciding the issue, the court first acknowledged the 
status of Native American tribes as “domestic dependent nations” 
with “inherent sovereign immunity” that requires clear 
 
316 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (alterations 
omitted) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 
U.S. 411, 418 (2001)). 
317 Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (stating that “an inter partes review 
proceeding is not the type of ‘suit’ to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy 
immunity under the common law” and then proceeding to distinguish the 
characteristics of IPRs from civil litigation (citation omitted)). 
318 Id. at *6–7. 
319 Id. at *7. 
320 Id. at *7–8. 
321 Id. at *15. 
322 See Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1547 (2019). As stated earlier, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all 
patent matters, so all PTAB decisions that are appealed are decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See supra text accompanying notes 
223–225. 
2019] PATENTLY INCONSISTENT 277 
congressional abrogation to subject them to suit.323  The court 
then went on to discuss the Supreme Court’s FMC decision and 
noted that “[a]lthough the precise contours of tribal sovereign 
immunity differ from those of state sovereign immunity, the 
FMC analysis is instructive” to apply in this case.324 
In applying the FMC test to IPR proceedings, the court noted 
four factors that distinguish IPRs from civil litigation and lead to 
the conclusion that tribal sovereign immunity is not implicated 
in IPRs.325  The first main factor was that unlike civil litigation 
where courts are required to adjudicate all complaints that are 
filed, the director of the USPTO has “broad discretion in deciding 
whether to institute review.”326  The court made clear that the 
director’s decision not to institute an IPR can be based on a 
number of factors ranging from the merits to a party’s status as a 
sovereign, and in exercising such discretion, the director acts as a 
politically accountable federal official.327  Such political 
accountability affords tribes the “dignity that is consistent with 
their status as sovereign entities”328 and makes institution of an 
IPR more akin to “cases in which an agency [independently] 
chooses whether to institute a proceeding” based on outside 
information supplied by a third party, which is allowed under 
FMC.329 
The second distinction that the court noted was that unlike 
civil litigation, once an IPR proceeding is initiated, the PTAB has 
the right to continue the proceeding even if the petitioner chooses 
not to be an active participant.330  In fact, the director even has 
the ability to participate in the appeals process of IPR 
decisions.331  Because of this factor, the court likened IPR 
proceedings to an agency “reconsidering its own grant of a public 
franchise.”332 
 
323 Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). 
324 Id. at 1326. 
325 Id. at 1327. 
326 Id. (citing Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 
S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018)). 
327 Id. 
328 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). 
329 Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1327. 
330 Id. at 1328. 
331 Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)). 
332 Id. 
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The third factor relied on by the court focused on the 
procedural rules that govern IPRs.333  The court noted that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for plaintiffs to make 
“significant amendments” to their complaints, whereas in IPRs, 
petitioners are only permitted to make minor “clerical or 
typographical corrections” to their petitions.334  Furthermore, a 
patentee may amend the claims of her patent in the middle of 
IPRs, which plaintiffs are not permitted to do to their complaints 
in civil litigation.335  Finally, while the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow various methods of discovery in civil litigation, 
discovery in IPRs is limited to deposing witnesses who submit 
affidavits or declarations and “what is otherwise necessary in the 
interest of justice.”336  And as it turns out, “what is otherwise 
necessary in the interest of justice” rarely includes live 
testimony.337 
The final factor relied on by the court is the fact that IPR 
proceedings serve the same purpose as inter partes 
reexamination, which as the Tribe conceded, tribal sovereign 
immunity would not apply to.338  Quoting the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the 
court reiterated that IPR and IPX “have the same ‘basic 
purposes, namely to reexamine an agency decision.’ ”339  Because 
the Tribe conceded that tribal sovereign immunity would not 
apply in IPX, which has the same purpose as IPR, the court 
concluded that it also does not apply to IPR patent 
reconsiderations.340  Shortly after the Federal Circuit issued its 
decision, the Tribe and Allergan filed petitions for the court to 
 
333 See id. 
334 Id. (citation omitted). 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 1328–29 (citing Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1270 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
338 Id. at 1329. Being that the court merely mentioned it in passing, it is unclear 
exactly why the Tribe would concede that tribal sovereign immunity would not apply 
to IPX proceedings. Perhaps it was a way for the Tribe to ease the court’s 
apprehension about allowing tribal sovereign immunity to shield patents from 
review by showing the court that even if it were to allow tribal sovereign immunity 
in IPRs, there are still other post-grant proceedings that can be used to review an 
issued patent—although IPXs no longer exist. Or perhaps it was the tribe trying to 
set IPRs apart from IPXs to make IPRs seem more akin to traditional litigation. 
Nonetheless, whatever the Tribe’s reasoning may have been, it evidently did not 
work out in its favor. 
339 Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)). 
340 Id. 
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rehear the issue en banc, which were denied on October 22, 
2018.341  On December 20, 2018, the Tribe and Allergan filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied by the Supreme 
Court on April 15, 2019.342 
C. The Previously Untenable Inconsistency of the PTAB and 
Federal Circuit Decisions 
In reading the PTAB’s five state sovereign immunity 
decisions and both the PTAB’s and Federal Circuit’s Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals decisions, it is clear that something does not 
add up.  Although all of the PTAB’s state sovereign immunity 
decisions did not result in a complete termination of the 
proceeding,343 the one consistent factor in each of those decisions 
was the PTAB’s determination that state sovereign immunity 
may be asserted in IPRs because civil litigation and IPRs are 
sufficiently similar to each other.344  In contrast, the PTAB’s 
decision in Mylan I made clear that tribal sovereign immunity 
did not apply in IPRs because of, among other things, the 
differences between civil litigation and IPR proceedings.345 
 
341 See Dave Simpson, Allergan, Tribe Want PTAB Immunity Denial Reheard En 
Banc, LAW360 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1075198/allergan-
tribe-want-ptab-immunity-denial-reheard-en-banc; Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. 
Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 2018-1638 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2018) (per curiam) 
(denying petition for rehearing en banc). 
342 See Mylan III, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mylan 
III, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 18-899). 
343 While the Covidien proceeding and the NeoChord proceeding resulted in 
complete termination due to state sovereign immunity, see NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. 
of Md., No. IPR2016-00208, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *31 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 
2017); Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 
WL 4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017), the Reactive Surfaces proceeding 
continued after the dismissal of the Regents of the University of Minnesota 
proceeding because Toyota, which is not a state entity, was a co-owner of the patent 
in question, and thus the Regents was not an indispensable party. Reactive Surfaces 
Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *7 
(P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017). Further, the LSI proceeding and the Ericsson proceeding 
were not terminated because although the Regents of the University of Minnesota is 
a state entity, it filed patent infringement suits regarding the patents in question, 
which was deemed to be a waiver of state sovereign immunity. See LSI Corp. v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-01068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-
01186, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017). 
344 LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *2; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2; Reactive 
Surfaces, 2017 WL 2992429, at *3; NeoChord, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 12969, at *14; 
Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11. 
345 See Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6–7 (P.T.A.B. Feb 
23, 2018) (stating that “an inter partes review proceeding is not the type of ‘suit’ to 
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1. The PTAB’s Internal Inconsistency 
The PTAB’s treatment of IPRs in its state sovereign 
immunity decisions is internally inconsistent with the PTAB’s 
own treatment of IPRs in its tribal immunity decision.346  Indeed, 
a closer look at the board’s treatment of the two different 
doctrines shows that in analyzing the characteristics of IPRs, the 
board highlighted characteristics that were similar to civil 
litigation in the state immunity proceedings and highlighted 
characteristics that distinguished IPRs from civil litigation in the 
tribal immunity proceeding.347  Perhaps this inconsistency is the 
result of the board’s realization that the Saint Regis Mohawk 
transaction could open the floodgates to a trend of tribes and 
states “rent[ing]” out sovereign immunity to private patent 
owners to avoid IPR.348  In realizing this, it is possible that the 
PTAB decided to narrow the reach of its state sovereign 
immunity holdings by (1) carving out a waiver exception,349 and 
(2) holding that FMC does not apply to the tribal doctrine so that 
it could reach a different holding as to tribal immunity.350 
 
which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy immunity under the common law” 
and then proceeding to discuss the characteristics that are unique to IPR 
proceedings (citation omitted)). 
346 Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11, with Mylan I, 2018 WL 
1100950, at *6–7. 
347 Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (noting that IPRs (1) are 
adversarial because they involve a third party petitioner contesting the validity of a 
patent owner’s patent by petitioning to the USPTO, (2) are set into motion by a third 
party’s filing of a petition, which is similar to a complaint, (3) share similar rules 
and procedures with civil litigation to a limited extent, and (4) have judges whose 
roles are similar to those of Article III judges), with Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at 
*6–7 (noting that IPRs (1) do not provide any form of relief to the petitioner, (2) do 
not involve any exercise of personal jurisdiction, (3) do not require participation by 
the parties for the PTAB to reach a final decision, and (4) may be continued by the 
PTAB after the parties settle their dispute). 
348 See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 
WL 4619790, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (“The Court has serious concerns about 
the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and the Tribe have employed. The essence 
of the matter is this: Allergan . . . has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan . . . to 
rent . . . the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR 
proceedings . . . .”); see also Susan Decker, Judges Criticize Allergan’s Use of 
Mohawk Tribe’s Sovereignty, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2018-06-04/allergan-use-of-tribe-s-sovereignty-called-risk-to-
patent-system (quoting the Association for Accessible Medicines’ assertion that 
“Allergan’s immunity-renting transaction with the tribe is the first of its kind, but if 
the gambit succeeds, it is sure not to be the last”). 
349 See LSI, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4; Ericsson, 2017 WL 6517563, at *4. 
350 Mylan I, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3–4. 
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2. Inconsistency Between the PTAB and the Federal Circuit 
Regardless of the rationale for the PTAB’s own internal 
inconsistency, the bigger concern is the inconsistency between 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mylan II and the PTAB’s state 
sovereign immunity decisions.  The Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Mylan II relied on the FMC framework to determine that IPRs 
are “both functionally and procedurally different from district 
court litigation.”351  Because of this difference, it concluded that 
tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in IPR 
proceedings.352 
Although the Federal Circuit made sure to clarify that it was 
only deciding the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity to 
IPRs and not the applicability of state sovereign immunity, the 
court’s holding and rationale could apply equally to the state 
doctrine.353  However, since the court’s holding was limited to 
deciding the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity, it is not 
binding precedent on the PTAB as to state sovereign 
immunity.354  As a result, the PTAB must dismiss IPRs where 
state sovereign immunity is asserted because of its own 
precedent that IPRs and civil litigation are similar,355 but it 
cannot dismiss IPRs where tribal sovereign immunity is asserted 
because of the Federal Circuit’s precedent that IPRs and civil 
litigation are different.356  This has created an inconsistency 
between the Federal Circuit’s holding and the PTAB’s prior 
holdings.357 
The inconsistency between the Federal Circuit and the PTAB 
is underscored by the fact that seven different states and two 
 
351 Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1547 (2019). 
352 Id. at 1329. 
353 Id. (“In this case we are only deciding whether tribal immunity applies in 
IPR. While we recognize there are many parallels, we leave for another day the 
question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity 
differently.”). 
354 Id. 
355 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 
WL 4015009, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). Note, however, that the PTAB does not 
have to dismiss the IPR if the waiver exception is implicated or if the state is a 
dispensable party. See LSI Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. IPR2017-
01068, 2017 WL 6517562, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP 
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429, at *7 (P.T.A.B. July 
13, 2017). 
356 Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329. 
357 Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11, with Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 
1329. 
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state universities filed amicus briefs in support of Allergan and 
the Tribe’s petition for a rehearing en banc that was filed on 
August 20, 2018.358  In their briefs, the states and universities 
made clear that despite the court’s limitation of its holding to 
tribal sovereign immunity, the reasoning that was used by the 
court could apply equally to the states’ immunity from IPR 
proceedings.359  As a result, the states would be equally 
vulnerable to challenges on state-owned patents, despite current 
favorable PTAB precedent.360 
IV. NEITHER TRIBAL NOR STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD  
APPLY TO IPRS 
Although the PTAB has continually been of the opinion that 
IPRs and civil litigation are sufficiently similar when state 
sovereign immunity is asserted, it clearly does not feel that the 
two proceedings are similar when tribal sovereign immunity is 
asserted.361  The Federal Circuit agrees with the PTAB as it 
pertains to the tribal doctrine, but the court has not explicitly 
made its opinion known regarding the state doctrine.362  
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II decision can be 
applied equally to state sovereign immunity.363  For the reasons 
that follow, this Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s rationale 
and holdings in both Mylan II and LSI Corp. are correct and 
should be applied to prohibit both tribal and state sovereign 
immunity from being asserted in IPRs. 
A. IPR Proceedings Are Significantly Different from Civil 
Litigation 
Since a large part of both the PTAB’s decisions and the 
Federal Circuit’s decision relied on a comparison of IPR 
 
358 Ryan Davis, States Back Tribe, Allergan Fed. Circ. Bid for PTAB Immunity, 




361 Compare Covidien, 2017 WL 4015009, at *11 (holding that state sovereign 
immunity applies in IPRs), with Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at 
*6–7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply 
in IPRs). 
362 Mylan II, 896 F.3d at 1329 (finding that “[i]n IPR, the agency proceedings 
are both functionally and procedurally different from district court litigation” but 
noting that it was leaving the question of state sovereign immunity for another day). 
363 See supra text accompanying note 353. 
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characteristics to civil litigation characteristics, an independent 
analysis of these characteristics is important to illustrate why 
the Federal Circuit’s holding is correct. 
1. Initiation and Initial Filings 
First, as noted by the Federal Circuit,364 IPR proceedings are 
instituted by the director of the USPTO at his or her discretion 
based upon information presented in a third party’s petition.365  
By contrast, a civil action is commenced in federal court upon a 
plaintiff’s filing of a complaint.366  Although one might analogize 
the director’s ability to decline to institute an IPR to a court’s 
ability to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to state a claim, such an 
analogy would be inapt as a court’s ability to dismiss for this 
reason depends on a defendant raising this as a defense.367  
Moreover, the USPTO director’s decision to decline to institute 
an IPR is “final and nonappealable,”368 whereas if a court 
dismisses a lawsuit for failure to state a claim, the court’s 
decision to dismiss may be appealed by the plaintiff.369 
Additionally, whereas defendants in civil litigation are 
required to respond to a complaint within twenty-one days of its 
filing,370 the default rule in IPR proceedings is that patentees 
have up to three months from the date of notice of the third 
party’s petition to file a preliminary response371 and “three 
months from the date the inter partes review was instituted” to 
 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 326–327. 
365 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1371 (2018) (“The decision whether to institute inter partes review is 
committed to the Director’s discretion.” (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 
S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016))); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (“The Director may not 
authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that 
the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims 
challenged in the petition.”). 
366 FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
367 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
368 35 U.S.C. § 314(d); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property 
Professors in Support of Appellees at 6, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 
926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1559) [hereinafter Brief of IP Professors] 
(stating that “the Patent Office has the unreviewable discretion to deny any 
petition”). 
369 See, e.g., Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 
1124 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reviewing a district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to 
state a claim on appeal). 
370 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1). 
371 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) (2018). 
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file a non-preliminary response to the third party’s petition.372  
This difference is significant because the Supreme Court has 
noted that motion practice is a factor to consider in deciding 
applicability of sovereign immunity to agency proceedings,373 and 
the fact that defendants in traditional litigation have only one 
chance to respond to a complaint within twenty-one days of its 
filing, whereas IPRs provide the patentee with two different 
three-month periods to respond to a third-party petition, 
underscores the non-adversarial nature of IPRs as compared to 
civil litigation.374  Further illustrating this difference between 
litigation and IPRs is the fact that if a defendant does not file a 
response to a complaint in federal court, default judgment may 
be entered against him or her,375 while a patentee holding a 
patent being petitioned for review may waive the right to a 
preliminary response without risking default judgment.376 
2. Discovery 
Further distinguishing IPRs from civil litigation are the 
different rules governing discovery in each.  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure call for a broad scope of discovery that allows 
parties to “obtain . . . any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 
case.”377  By allowing such a broad scope for discovery, parties in 
litigation have the discretion to choose from an arsenal of 
discovery options such as conducting depositions,378 serving 
written interrogatories,379 demanding inspection or document 
production,380 and requesting admissions.381 
 
372 Id. § 42.120(b). 
373 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 757 (2002); see 
also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 5–6 (explaining the difference between 
motion practice in traditional litigation and motion practice in IPRs). 
374 See supra text accompanying notes 370–372. 
375 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1), 55(a); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 
368, at 6 (stating that failing to respond to a complaint in federal court can lead to 
default judgment against defendant). 
376 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 6 
(stating that failing to respond to an IPR petition cannot lead to default judgment 
against patentee). For more on default judgment and non-participation by the 
patentee, see infra notes 393–396 and accompanying text. 
377 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 8–9 
(explaining the difference between discovery in traditional litigation and discovery 
in IPRs). 
378 FED. R. CIV. P. 28(a). 
379 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). 
380 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
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In contrast to the large variety of discovery options available 
in civil litigation, the PTAB has readily conceded that discovery 
in IPRs is of a limited nature.382  Specifically, IPR discovery only 
allows “the deposition of witnesses submitting affidavits or 
declarations; and what is otherwise necessary in the interest of 
justice.”383  Thus, if a party seeks additional discovery, the party 
must either receive the opposing party’s consent or show that 
additional discovery is in the interest of justice.384 
3. Article III Standing 
Another major difference between civil litigation and IPRs is 
that an IPR does not require the petitioner to satisfy the 
requirements of Article III standing to file a petition.385  This is 
an important factor to consider in distinguishing the two because 
while a party only needs to be someone other than the patent 
owner to file a petition for an IPR proceeding,386 in civil litigation 
the plaintiff is required to meet several requirements illustrating 
that they have an interest in the outcome of a case in order to 
proceed to a final decision.387 
 
381 FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1). 
382 See Garmin Int’l., Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 2013 
WL 11311697, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013) (discussing the scope of discovery in IPR 
proceedings and then noting that such rules are “significantly different from the 
scope of discovery generally available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); 
see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 8–9 (discussing the difference 
between discovery in IPRs and discovery in traditional litigation). 
383 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2018); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 
8–9 (stating that beyond limited preliminary discovery, the IPR discovery rules only 
allow what is “in the interest of justice”). 
384 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2) (2018); Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 887 
F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Under the Board’s procedures, the burden is on 
the party seeking discovery to show that the requested discovery would be likely to 
produce favorable evidence.”). 
385 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2143–44 (2016) (citation omited); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 6, 
15 (discussing the lack of requirements for IPR petitioners to have Article III 
standing). 
386 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with 
the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”). 
387 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (stating that 
the constitutional minimum for standing requires the plaintiff to show (1) an injury 
in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and 
(3) a likelihood of redressing the injury with a favorable decision (citations omitted)). 
If the plaintiff does not illustrate these three elements, the case will be dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., La Botz v. FEC, 61 F. Supp. 3d 21, 27 
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Harnage v. Dzurenda, 176 F. Supp. 3d 40, 45 (D. Conn. 2016). 
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This principle is emphasized even further by the fact that 
the petitioner may petition the PTAB for an IPR and participate 
in that IPR if it is instituted, but if the PTAB reaches a decision 
that does not satisfy the petitioner, it cannot appeal the decision 
to the Federal Circuit if it does not illustrate that it has Article 
III standing to sue in federal court.388  This caveat once again 
underscores that the purpose of IPRs is to ensure the patent 
system’s efficiency by reexamining previously granted patents for 
validity alone, which is completely distinguishable from the 
resolution of cases or controversies between multiple parties that 
occurs in federal courts.389 
4. Duration of Proceedings & Final Decisions 
Finally, one of the most important differences between the 
IPRs and civil litigation is the duration of each proceeding.  In 
civil litigation, courts are not constrained by any deadline by 
which they must reach a decision in a case.390  In fact, the 
average length of patent litigation ranges from twenty-four to 
thirty-six months.391  This is in stark contrast to IPRs, which are 
required to reach a final decision within one year of the director’s 
instituting of the proceeding, with the possibility of the director 
 
388 See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (citation omitted); Phigenix, Inc. v. 
Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1171–72, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that an 
IPR petitioner did not have standing to appeal the PTAB’s final decision in federal 
court). 
389 See Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 2. Compare Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2144 (second ellipsis in original) (“[T]he purpose of [inter partes review] is not 
quite the same as the purpose of district court litigation. . . . [I]nter partes review 
helps protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent 
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.’ ” (quoting Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945))), with U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases [or 
controversies] . . . arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United 
States.”). 
390 Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital 
Resource in the Era of Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269, 1289 
(2005) (illustrating that over the years, the average length of litigation has varied). 
391 Kyle Pietari, Note: An Overview and Comparison of U.S. and Japanese 
Patent Litigation, Part II, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 970, 973 (2016); see 
Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 237, 299 (2006). 
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extending the proceeding for an additional six months “for good 
cause.”392 
Moreover, the presence or participation of the petitioner and 
patent holder is not required in order for the PTAB to reach a 
final decision within the one-year time constraint,393 as IPRs 
solely focus on deciding patent validity, whereas adversarial 
patent litigation tends to be focused on infringement liability.394  
In fact, the PTAB may continue an IPR proceeding and make a 
final determination as to a patent’s validity even if the patentee 
and third party petitioner come to a settlement agreement.395  
This greatly differs from civil litigation, which calls for the court 
to dismiss a suit upon a settlement between the parties.396 
These distinctions demonstrate the dissimilar purposes that 
the two proceedings serve.  The shorter duration of IPRs and the 
PTAB’s ability to reach a final decision even after the parties 
settle show that the true purpose of IPRs is to provide a “quick, 
inexpensive, and reliable” means of ensuring and improving the 
quality of the patent system by reexamining a prior patent 
grant.397  The longer duration of civil litigation and the dismissal 
of suits upon settlement show that the purpose of Article III 
courts is to resolve “all Cases [or controversies], in Law and 
 
392 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2018); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, 
at 7 (contrasting the requirement for IPRs to reach final disposition within one year 
with the lack of a time limit for traditional litigation). 
393 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); Microsoft Corp. v. Global Techs., Inc., No. IPR2016-
00663, 2017 WL 2417332, at *3 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2017) (entering a final written 
decision adverse to patent owner despite the owner’s lack of appearance before the 
board); Old Republic Gen. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,519,581 B1, 
No. IPR2015-01956, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 8446, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2017) 
(proceeding to a final written decision without the appearance of the patent owner 
before the board); see also Brief of IP Professors, supra note 368, at 16 (discussing 
how the Patent Office can reach a final decision without the patentee’s or 
petitioner’s participation). 
394 See supra text accompanying note 258. 
395 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (2018); see also Mylan II, 896 
F.3d 1322, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“And if the third party settles, 
the proceeding does not end, and the USPTO may continue on to a final written 
decision.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
396 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
397 S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 20 (2008) (noting that inter partes reexamination 
should be replaced by a new post-grant review that provides a “quick, inexpensive, 
and reliable” means of reevaluating patent validity); see Cuozzo Speed Techns., LLC 
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011) 
(discussing the purpose of the America Invents Act); see also Brief of IP Professors, 
supra note 368, at 12 (stating that the purpose of IPRs is to take a second look at a 
prior patent grant to ensure that patents are kept within their scope). 
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Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, [and] the Laws of the 
United States” by hearing each party’s side of the story.398 
B. Policy Implications of Allowing Sovereign Immunity in  
 IPR Proceedings 
To allow any form of sovereign immunity to prevail as a 
defense to IPRs would circumvent the very purpose of the patent 
system and would make sovereign-owned patents more valuable 
than patents owned by the general public.399  This is evident 
when taking a closer look at the Supreme Court’s Oil States 
decision.400 
As discussed earlier, Oil States addressed the 
constitutionality of IPRs, but in doing so, it had some 
implications for when sovereign immunity should be allowed to 
be asserted in IPRs.401  As the Oil States Court pointed out, 
“[i]nter partes review is ‘a second look at an earlier 
administrative grant of a patent,’ ” and in doing so, “[t]he Board 
considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO 
considered when granting the patent.”402  By having the PTAB 
reexamine granted patents, the USPTO “protects ‘the public’s 
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept 
within their legitimate scope.’ ”403  Moreover, as the Oil States 
Court made clear, the USPTO grants patents on the condition 
that they may potentially be revoked upon a reexamination at a 
later date,404 which is well within their authority.405 
Since the Oil States Court held that IPRs are constitutional 
and that it is entirely permissible for the USPTO to grant 
 
398 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
399 See Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of 
the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1574, 1611–12 (2010). 
400 See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
401 Supra Section II.C. 
402 Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144). 
403 Id. (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144). 
404 Id. (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) 
(emphasis added) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”); id. § 311(a) (authorizing third parties to petition for inter 
partes review of a patent and request for such patent to be cancelled). 
405 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374–75 (illustrating that it is entirely 
permissible for the USPTO to grant patents subject to later reexamination and 
cancellation). 
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patents subject to a later reexamination and revocation, allowing 
tribes and states to avoid IPR proceedings would make their 
patents more valuable than those of non-tribal and non-state 
entities or individuals.406  In fact, empirical evidence has 
suggested that the ability to shield a patent from review by 
asserting sovereign immunity has led to heightened 
aggressiveness with sovereign patent licensing.407  This is a direct 
result of the fact that would-be petitioners are unable to request 
a reexamination in IPR or file suit in district court.408  In turn, 
sovereign patentees and assignees are left with all of the 
bargaining power in licensing agreements, which leads to 
increased licensing costs and causes (1) a heightened cost of 
innovation for others, and (2) a decrease in overall efficiency of 
the patent system.409 
In contrast, since privately owned patents are subject to 
IPRs there is always a chance for post-grant invalidation.  This 
has the potential to dissuade investors or potential licensees from 
doing business with private patent owners and instead doing 
business with sovereign patent owners of similar technology.  
Indeed, IPRs have a reputation for being “challenger friendly” 
due to statistics that show a high percentage of patent claims 
challenged in IPR are deemed unpatentable or voluntarily 
cancelled by the patent owner before the board reaches a final 
decision.410  Thus, allowing this kind of circumvention of the IPR 
 
406 See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612 (showing that the ability of states to 
assert state sovereign immunity provides them with more leverage in negotiating 
license agreements, and thus allows states to reap increased profits from patent 
licenses); see also Mylan I, No. IPR2016-01127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B. 
Feb. 23, 2018) (“[T]he scope of the authority granted by Congress to the Patent 
Office with respect to inter partes review proceedings is limited to assessing the 
patentability of the challenged claims.”). 
407 See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612; see also Brief of IP Professors, 
supra note 368, at 17 (stating that evidence suggests states are more aggressive 
patent licensors since they are shielded from patent validity challenges in court). 
408 See Narechania, supra note 399, at 1612. 
409 See id. Further, the ability to shield a patent from IPR could lead to 
unpredictability of patent ownership due to spontaneous patent assignments as a 
method of avoiding review. See, e.g., Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
410 Justin Oliver et al., Is PTAB ‘Death Squad’ Just a Myth? INTELL. PROP. 
MAG., June 2015, at 48, 48–49, https://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/ 
patent/is-ptab-death-squad-just-a-myth-109342.htm. From the inception of IPRs on 
September 16, 2012, through October 31, 2018, there have been 9,292 petitions for 
IPR filed with the PTAB. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR, 
CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., at 10 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/trial_statistics_oct_2018.pdf. Of these petitions, prior to 
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process harms entrepreneurs, which directly undermines one of 
the main goals of the AIA and the overall patent system.411 
Moreover, since IPRs focus on novelty and nonobviousness of 
the patent in question, and the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements prevent inventors from obtaining a patent on 
public information, allowing sovereigns to avoid IPRs would 
prevent the PTAB from ensuring that public information remains 
in the public domain.412  As a result, the patent system’s purpose 
would be thwarted.413 
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and State Sovereign Immunity 
Should Receive Equal Treatment in IPRs Because They Are 
Similar in Purpose and Function 
As stated above, tribal and state sovereign immunity serve 
the same function as each other with respect to the sovereigns 
that they serve to protect, and thus, they should receive the same 
treatment in IPRs.414  Tribes may not be sued by private 
individuals, private entities, or states; and states may not be 
sued by private individuals, private entities, or tribes.415  
Although Congress’s ability to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity has a broader scope than its ability to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity,416 Congress has not chosen to do so, and 
thus, tribal sovereign immunity can be said to stand on the same 
 
institution of the IPR there have been 1,158 settled between the parties, 89 
dismissed, 34 grants on requests for adverse judgment by the patentee, and 2,372 
denied by the PTAB. Id. Further, of the 9,292 petitions there have been 4,783 IPRs 
instituted by the PTAB, with 941 settling after institution, 52 dismissed by the 
PTAB, 298 grants on requests for adverse judgment by the patentee, and 2,399 final 
written decisions by the PTAB. Id. Of the 2,399 final written decisions there were 
461 (19%) that did not deem any of the challenged patent claims to be invalid, 398 
(17%) that deemed some of the challenged patent claims to be invalid, and 1,540 
(64%) that deemed all of the challenged patent claims to be invalid. Id. This means 
that 40% of the 4,783 IPRs that have been instituted since September 16, 2012, have 
led to at least one challenged claim being invalidated, and of the 2,399 IPRs 
reaching a final written decision, 81% have resulted in at least one challenged claim 
being invalidated. See id. 
411 See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Signing of the America Invests 
Act (Sept. 16, 2011), in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. S6, 2011 WL 5903407 (“[The America 
Invents Act] will . . . help give entrepreneurs the protection and the confidence they 
need to attract investment, to grow their businesses, and to hire more workers.”). 
412 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018); Margo A. Bagley, Response, Still Patently 
Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239, 242 (2003). 
413 See supra text accompanying notes 191–192. 
414 See supra Section I.C. 
415 See supra Section I.C. 
416 See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text. 
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ground as state sovereign immunity.417  In fact, some are of the 
opinion that tribal sovereign immunity is a stronger doctrine 
than state sovereign immunity.418 
Regardless of whether tribal sovereign immunity is actually 
stronger than state sovereign immunity, it is unquestionably 
equivalent to state sovereign immunity.  Thus, since the Federal 
Circuit is correct in its holding that tribal sovereign immunity 
may not be asserted in IPRs, it must be equally true that state 
sovereign immunity may not be asserted in IPRs. 
CONCLUSION 
Both tribal and state sovereign immunity have been 
recognized as common law doctrines that predate the 
Constitution and serve the purpose of according tribes and states 
the dignity and respect that sovereign entities deserve.  Despite 
the fact that the two doctrines serve the same purpose and the 
tribal doctrine has yet to be abrogated by Congress, the PTAB 
has treated state sovereign immunity more favorably than tribal 
sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings. 
This has caused a logical inconsistency within the PTAB, as 
well as an inconsistency between the Federal Circuit’s Mylan II 
rationale and the PTAB’s state sovereign immunity precedent.  
Furthermore, allowing states to avoid IPR proceedings due to 
state sovereign immunity claims thwarts the ability of IPRs to 
“protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent 
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope,’ ”419 and, 
more importantly, hinders the patent system’s goal to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”420 
Because the characteristics and features of inter partes 
review make the proceeding completely distinguishable from civil 
litigation, the Federal Circuit was correct in Mylan II when it 
held that “tribal sovereign immunity cannot be asserted in 
IPRs”421 and in LSI Corp. when it held that state sovereign 
 
417 See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text. 
418 See supra note 161. 
419 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (ellipsis in 
original) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945)). 
420 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
421 Mylan II, 896 F.3d 1322, 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1547 (2019). 
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immunity cannot be asserted in IPRs.422  This is because (1) to 
allow the states, or any sovereign for the matter, to successfully 
assert sovereign immunity in IPRs would negatively affect 
various policy concerns for the patent system, and (2) tribal 
sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity are relatively 
equivalent doctrines to one another, so it would not make sense 
to ban one doctrine and permit the other.  As a result of the 
foregoing, neither tribal sovereign immunity nor state sovereign 
immunity should be applicable as a defense to inter partes review 
proceedings. 
 
422 Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
